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Sen. CLARO M. RECTO

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TEODORO A. AGONCILLO

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Ambeth Ocampo

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INTRODUCTION

THIS YEAR MARKS THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE approval of the Philippine Constitution. As one looks back nostalgically to those hectic days when the Organic Law was being debated on the convention floor, one inevitably casts a glance at its architect who, more than any man, performed with consummate skill the arduous task of guiding the members of the Constitutional Convention: CLARO M. RECTO.

Recto has lived in many difficult eras of Philippine history. They were eras that tested the temper, integrity, learning, and patriotism of men who had been catapulted to positions of power and authority by a people who had just then grasped the meaning of the secret ballot. Yet difficult as the times were, Recto came out a consistent victor in the midst of political chicanery and moral corruption. For he was, as he continues to be, a man with a deep sense of history who employed the usable past in the service of the unstable present, and the present in the service of the nebulous future.

In any question of national importance that demands sobriety and keen intelligence in its resolution, Recto comes forward, in the full panoply of culture, learning, and patriotism, to bring light where there are only shadows, order where there is chaos, wisdom where there is blather, and scintillating ideas where there are mere solemn platitudes.

Most of the time he was alone fighting for the future of his country. Alone but not lonely, he won his battles not on the days they were fought, but in the years when perspective had intervened. It is thus that he has established himself, by the unerring verdict of history, as seer and prophet.

In integrity and intensity of purpose, Recto reminds one of Apolinario Mabini, the Sublime Paralytic who fought relentlessly for his country's welfare at a time when to do otherwise would have meant, for him, a life of ease and comfort. Likewise, Recto battled the forces of reaction and ignorance unmindful of his personal safety and political future. In both Mabini and Recto, one witnesses the glowing symbol of an aroused Filipinism.

In this twenty-fifth anniversary of the approval of the Constitution, which marks also the seventieth birthday of Senator Claro M. Recto, the Philippine Historical Association joins the nation in honoring both the Instrument and its brilliant architect. In all humility, but with a stern faith, the Association dedicates this Special Number of the *Historical Bulletin* to Senator Recto whose life is one long era of dedicated patriotism and service to his country.

—the editor

CLARO M. RECTO, THE TRUE NATIONALIST*

By J. Collas

A few years ago, the eminent American philosopher, John Dewey, presented to the world what with mingled feelings of pride and satisfaction he called *The Living Thoughts of Thomas Jefferson.* In that fascinating book, he paid the author of the Declaration of Independence a well-deserved tribute. Said he, "considering his times and the difficult and important part he played in them, there remains the image of a magnanimous, high-spirited public gentleman who subordinated himself with complete devotion to what he conceived to be the welfare of the country he loved."

Some such tribute could be paid with equal fitness and propriety by a grateful people to the undisputed leader and statesman of Quezon and Batangas, Senator Claro M. Recto. Attached to him is the unique title and distinction — the architect of the Philippine Constitution. He was its presiding officer, its guiding spirit. Like Jefferson, he is a deep thinker with a vast culture. Endowed with an insatiable intellectual curiosity that attracts young men with bright and liberal ideas, he can justifiably boast with Solon that he grows old learning — acquiring the wealth that will not perish. He is a creative writer both in English and Spanish, and possesses a polished and trenchant style, a sparkling wit, a nimble and caustic tongue. To such rare gifts may be added his ability to coin subtly ironic and sometimes devastating *bons mots* and phrases. In a clash with a persistent interpolating colleague who triumphantly concluded, "There is no blinder man more than a man who refuses to see," he promptly countered to the applause of the gallery, "Blessed are those who do not see and yet believe."

Senator Recto's devotion to his country is not only intense and intransigent, but utterly unselfish — something like Rizal's, his prototype in the ardor of his patriotism. Whenever the honor, security, or dignity of his country is involved, he is sure to be in the vanguard, in the thick of the fray, fighting with the rapier of his wit and the barbed darts of his logic. He gives no quarter and asks none. His wide reading of history has taught him and his own experience has confirmed that "nations that want protectors will have masters," and master or masters he does not like either for himself or his father-land.

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* A former newspaperman and secretary to the late President Elpidio Quirino, Mr. Juan Collas is an eminent Rizalist.

Foreign critics, who are bent on perpetuating wherever possible the "white man's burden" which in reality is the white man's paradise on earth, bitterly resent Recto's outspokenness, his frequent reference to the one-way traffic to which his native-land has been subjected ever since a Portuguese adventurer in the service of Spain accidentally "discovered" the Islands. What seems to embitter them so much is his nationalism — his people's insistent cry for unfattered freedom — his resolute refusal to yield an inch of his native soil, especially when that soil is not only for use, but also for abuse. This was made unmistakably patent in the protracted discussions on the long-standing bases question. Basically, that question which to him strikes deep at the heart of Philippine sovereignty, is: Is the Philippines a real sovereign nation? That assumption was implied in the proclamation of her independence, an independence which, he insists, was not a grant, but a recognition, a restoration, of what had previously existed. If the Philippines is really sovereign, then she ought to be the sole lady and mistress of every nook and corner of her home, and nobody else.

That, in his opinion, was the meaning of the independence of the Philippines so movingly and memorably proclaimed by the President of the United States on July 4, 1946, if the act had any meaning at all. If the new nation, the first to achieve political freedom in the Far East, was, like the mother-country, conceived in liberty and "dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal," why should not the same liberty and equality be strictly observed in the Philippines, particularly in her relations with the United States? Does the meaning of such noble words differ according to race, sect, and color? And are not liberty and equality the corner-stones of democracy, the goal of the United Nations?

Perceptive and remorselessly logical in his acts as well as in his application of principles, Senator Recto, nationalist to the core, demands on every occasion that in dealing with the Philippines, his and Rizal's "Eden-isles" regained, the United States Department of State must treat her not condescendingly or as inferior, but as an equal. More than an equal, she is entitled to every consideration that a tested friend and unfailing ally in times of storm and stress deserves. That is why as a man of honor and inveterate nationalist, Recto fights with all the panoply of logic and history, when imperialists still wielding power and authority, try to dictate to what he calls colonially-minded Filipino diplomats or representatives "trained in the art of sycophancy."

It was his nationalism, his passionate love of his country and devotion to its interests that during the dark and tragic night of Japanese occupation prompted him to yield to the pressure of joining the Philippine government. His motive was to help cushion as much as possible the impact of the invasion and the invader's inhumanity to man. First, he served as secretary of education. He seemed to have cherished the illusion that in time he would be able to impart to the mighty and co-prosperous master a better or at least a more humane education just as the Greeks did when through sheer force of arms the Romans overran their country. Later, when the Philippines could not but bow to the inevitable and accept the "honor" of an empty independence, he was designated secretary of foreign affairs. He knew that there was absolutely nothing foreign in the affairs of the country except, perhaps, the brutality of the soldiery; but if he wanted to attain his object, his only recourse was to play ball, to pretend like the rest of the people.

In both positions he conducted himself with dignity or as much dignity as the circumstances permitted. That was in contrast with the attitude of some of his colleagues who enhanced their dignity by saluting with a respectful bow practically every shabby "extension of His Imperial Majesty" they met in the street. One even bowed over the telephone! Irritated in his moments of ease in his "foreign office," he resolved to reassert his nationalism and devotion to his country by drafting a very undiplomatic *note verbale* dripping with sarcasm and irony. It was his spirit of opposition running wild. He addressed his letter to the Japanese High Command whose word was law and who could not be approached except with "trepidation." In it he aired his and his people's litany of grievances against the Japanese soldiers, particularly the *Kempeitai*, the dreaded military police. He enumerated at leisure the many atrocious crimes committed hourly with total impunity by the Japanese soldiers and the Japanese military police against Filipino citizens, men and women, young and old, whom they slapped, kicked, and beheaded in public on mere suspicion or on no suspicion at all.

Bluntly, boldly, at the risk of losing his own head, he asked not in the language of diplomacy but in that of indignation, how the Japanese Imperial Government could hope to convince the Filipino people that Japan was sincerely interested in helping and protecting them when they were being subjected to all sorts of indignities, humiliations and tortures by the Japanese authorities for the slightest offense imaginable. As a matter of precaution, Recto marked his note as confidential. The High Command and his aides, though thoroughly provoked, must have treated it in the same manner; but in time it found its way to the people, giving them fresh hope and courage and the Japanese authorities a subtle dig, a resounding diplomatic slap.

The same devotion to country coupled with his resolve to maintain at all costs its honor and dignity impelled him to rush to the Philippine Senate late in 1951 after the signing in San Francisco, California, of the Japanese Peace Treaty on September 8, 1951. His purpose was to file a resolution, rejecting outright that agreement, but terminating the state of war with Japan. Under the Philippine Constitution, the President is empowered "with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate, to make treaties," etc. What apparently aroused his ire was that the late John Foster Dulles, at the time the State Department's "trouble-shooter" who created more trouble than he could shoot, had been acting much like a jealous and doting father. Credited with paternity of the draft treaty, he regarded his offspring as a perfect specimen and compelled others to agree with him. Thus the Filipino delegates were reportedly told to sign on the dotted line and like good soldiers in the diplomatic corps, they did. Only Soviet Russia and sovietized Poland and Czechoslovakia refused to do the Republican diplomat's bidding.

Burning with indignation at once righteous and political, Recto rose on the floor of the senate to denounce what he called "the Dulles treaty." Vividly he had recalled that on August 13, 1943, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt had assured the Filipino people in a Washington broadcast beamed to the Philippines that the story of Bataan and Corregidor, deathless symbols of resistance and heroism, would be remembered "so long as men continue to respect bravery and devotion and determination." The Filipino people, he had affirmed, "gave final proof that theirs was a nation fit to be respected as the equal to any on earth, not in size or wealth, but in the stout heart and national dignity which are the true measures of a people." That broadcast he had concluded with a solemn promise: "The Philippine government will have its rightful place in the conference which will follow the defeat of Japan."

And yet, the Batangas senator remembered with regret, "as early as that September day of 1945, our claim to victory was already questioned and disputed." In fact, he added vehemently, "despite Bataan and Corregidor, no Filipino general was called by the Allied Supreme Commander to sign the historic instrument of Japanese surrender aboard the *Missouri*. We were ignored, just as today we are being ignored . . . Cheated once of the glory of our victory, we are going to be cheated again of its rightful spoils."

Had the then Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, and his Republican "trouble shooter" forgotten Roosevelt's promise or had they just ignored it since the then ailing Chief Executive was already dead and could not possibly honor his plighted word? Roosevelt had spoken as the head of the most powerful nation on earth, and his pledge as such ought not to be taken lightly by his successors in authority. Dulles and Acheson showed no sign or inclination whatever to recognize the Philippine claim to cash reparations. The "Dulles Treaty" itself made that very clear. It recognized, it said, "that the resources of Japan are not presently sufficient, if it is to maintain a viable economy, to make complete reparation for all such damage and suffering" as it had caused "and at the same time meet its other obligations. Therefore," it concluded, "Japan will promptly enter into negotiations with Allied Powers so desiring, whose present territories were occupied by Japanese forces and damaged by Japan, with a view to assisting to compensate those countries for the cost of repairing the damage done, by making available the services of the Japanese people in production, salvaging and other work for the Allied Powers in question. Such arrangements shall void the imposition of additional liabilities on other Allied Powers. and, where the manufacturing of raw materials is called for, they shall be supplied by the Allied Powers in question, so as not to throw any foreign exchange burden upon Japan. . . . ."

It did not look as if the Philippines would get nothing after so much suffering and sacrifice. Not only was the Philippine claim being brushed aside, but what was worse, it was losing apparently American support. There was a time, Recto said rather sadly, when "we stood side by side with the United States," fighting the common enemy. "That was," he reminded his audience, "in the darkest days of the war" when the stark realities of defeat with appalling tragedy were staring them in the face. The times, unfortunately, had changed and the honeymoon with its love-scented promises was over. So "in the bright noonday of victory it seems that we must stand alone." However, he consoled his colleagues and the gallery, "let it not dishearten us, and I say this in the name of our racial dignity and national interests."

By approving his resolution and rejecting the treaty, would the Philippines gain or lose? "By virtue of the Dulles treaty," he said, "Japan is automatically restored to her normal position in the political and economic structure of Southeast Asia and the democratic world, at no cost to herself, and with politically no obligations. If we ratify that arrangement, we shall be wholly unable to bargain because not only shall we be barred from asking reparations in cash, reparations in kind, or reparations of any sort except vague and uncertain reparations in services, but what is even worse at this state, we shall be bound by the admission made in the treaty that Japan does not have the present capacity to pay . . . ."

"Indeed," he argued persuasively, "under the Dulles treaty, we do not know, we cannot tell, and we cannot compel Japan to tell, just how much she will pay or when she will pay, or if she will ever pay at all, even in services only." Worse, "the Japanese hold the initiative and control the course of negotiations firmly and completely. "On the other hand," he concluded, "if we reject the treaty and merely terminate the state of war with this resolution, we leave the door open for bilateral bargaining, bound by no commitments or admissions, and we shall retain our share of the initiative and an equal control of developments."

For his courageous stand and his eloquent and convincing exposition of the treaty, the administration, sure of victory in its attempt to ram it through, failed to secure the constitutional requirement of two-thirds of all the members of the senate. Japan realized the force of logic of the born oppositionist and nationalist and immediately sent to the Philippines in succession two of her top-ranking diplomats: Murata first and Ohno later. Murata, who was Japan's highest civilian official in the Philippines during the occupation and had befriended many of the ablest leaders of the country, failed in his mission, but Ohno succeeded in persuading the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Garcia to accept what came to be called the "Ohno-Garcia agreement" entailing the payment by Japan of 400 million dollars by way of reparation to the Philippines. Recto strongly opposed and publicly denounced the agreement, saying the Philippines was again being scandalously short-changed. President Ramon Magsaysay took an unprecedented move. He addressed a private letter to the Japanese Prime Minister, assuring him that half a billion dollars would be acceptable. For some reason, however, the deal did not go through either. Thanks to the efforts and insistence of the Senator from Batangas, the amount was subsequently raised to 800 million dollars—his gift to his countrymen through his resolution, his eloquent defense of it, and his power of persuasion. Unfortunately for the people, influence peddlers seem to be enjoying the lion's share of the spoils of victory.

Chosen chairman of the Senate's foreign relations committee, Recto readily found himself at odds with the State Department, his favorite target. Upon the change of administration in the United States, the powerful department was being headed by Secretary Dulles of the Dulles treaty fame. On one occasion, in a clash of opinions, Recto referred to him as paper-tiger. His reason was that the distinguished Secretary of State had acquired the habit of threatening Soviet Russia and Red China with "massive retaliation" every time Khruschev took a poke at Southern Korea or elsewhere and Mao Tse-tung tried to blast Quemoy out of Chiang Kai-shek's territory.

Recto scored another signal victory for his country and himself when Herbert Brownell, Jr., U.S. Attorney General, advanced the novel and startling claim that the United States government owned by purchase or donation the American bases in the Philippines. Recto rejected the claim, arguing that the bases were part and parcel of Philippine territory and consequently could neither be sold, bought, alienated, or given away. The Philipines of necessity, he maintained, remains the sole owner. Last year, the American government tacitly upheld Recto's contention and began turning over to the Philippine government a number of bases no longer needed for mutual defense purposes.

That triumph was followed by another, perhaps far more important. Eight years ago, Recto began agitating for an express guarantee in a formal treaty of security and mutual defense with the United States, that an attack on the Philippines by a foreign power would mean an automatic retaliation by America. No longer was he satisfied with promises and assurances. "If America," he said, "really believes that war is inevitable, then let her give Asia a resolute leadership we can trust; let her give us the same unconditional pledges and guarantees and the same actual evidence of a spiritual quality and common fate that she has given to her kinsmen and allies across the Atlantic; and we shall have justification for the risk of war and incentive to make common cause. Otherwise we must restrain our enthusiasm, dissemble our sympathies, moderate our words and actions, and in fulfillment of the primitive duty of self-preservation, make no enemies where we can make no friends, and hold our peace." This he followed with a moving and classic peroration.

"Let not Macaulay's traveller from New Zealand," he said, "exploring the spectral ruins of Manila in the course of his post-atomic war peregrinations, and cautiously testing the radioactive waters of the Pasig from the broken arches of Quezon Bridge,

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have cause to ponder that in those shattered tenements and poisoned fields and rivers once lived a nation unique in the annals of mankind; free men who put their liberties on the auction block, a sacrificial race with a mysterious urge to suicide, who, being weak and weaponless, took upon themselves the quarrels of the strong, and having been warned of their abandonment, still persisted in their lonely course, and whose brutalized and deformed survivors, scrambling with stunted limbs in the infected debris of their liberated cities, had forgotten even the echo of the memory of the strange illusion for which their race had fought and perished."

Recently, the United States and the Philippines through their respective representatives signed an agreement or understanding, calling for the automatic retaliation that Recto had been consistently demanding. The agreement went further, in compliance with another pet project and proposal of the Batangas senator, that the Philippines cannot be made a missile site without her consent. That decidedly was another feather in the nationalist's cap.

Time and again, American writers, correspondents, and magazines have attacked him for what they are pleased to call his "ultra-nationalism." They have denounced him as anti-American and pro-Communist as if the easiest and least dangerous way to dispose of an opponent were to label him as red and place him under the ban of the church to which, for all its faults and acts of intolerance, he belongs . . . But, he counters, was it not the former Civil Governor William Howard Taft, later President and Chief Justice of the United States, who first adopted the policy of the "Philippines for the Filipinos"? Would the United States, he asks, be what she is today, "her sovereignty supreme and undiminished, had she not pursued nationalistic policies throughout her national independent existence?"

In a recent address he delivered before Manila's Rotary Club, he showed that since the establishment or founding of the American Republic its foreign policy has always been based on self-interest. He quoted Washington as saying, that "it is folly in one nation to look for disinterested favors from another" and warning that "no nation is to be trusted further than it is bound by its interests." He quoted President Eisenhower as stating that "everything we do in the foreign field has for its basic purpose our own national security, our national prosperity," and that "we are not doing these things in the foreign field as a matter of altruism and charity." He quoted Secretary Dulles as telling the American Congress that "the State Department does not exist to make friends but to protect the interests of the United States." And he quoted former Ambassador Bohlen as expressing, "I expect the government of the Philippines to be just as assiduous in protecting its rights and interests as I am in protecting those of the United States." What is wrong then with protecting his country's interests? Why should he be criticized for doing what he conceives to be his paramount duty while those foreigners who are doing the same thing and preaching the same principles are praised as patriots and leaders and statesmen? Is it any wonder that he should complain: "When the big powers nationalize their banks or jealously implement their immigration laws barring aliens from entering their territories, we all agree that those acts constitute a legitimate exercise of sovereign rights. But when small nations try to assert even the most elementary rights of sovereignty they arouse the ire of the great. Is it," he asks, "that small nations are sovereign as the big powers will allow them to be? . . . We have no desire and we have never attempted to deny the national self-interest of other peoples in their own territories. We merely want to defend our own in our own territory."

Anything wrong with that principle? Writing on the same subject-matter, Harold J. Laski, regarded as "one of the most important political philosophers of our time," said, "the right to manage our own affairs does not mean the right to manage other people's affairs. The development of international law and convention was due to the realization that we cannot separate the two; that because some of our decisions affect other people, it is well that other people should be consulted when they are being made . . . It is the perception that what touches all should be decided by all." That, exactly, is the goal of the United Nations when they prepared their Declaration of Human Rights. And was not that the message, the teaching of Jesus Christ when he said, "Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them" or, as Luke put it, "as you wish that men would do to you, do so to them"?

By far, one of the best and briefest summaries of Senator Recto's biography was the one embodied in a Knights of Rizal recent citation, conferring upon him the Grand Cross "in recognition of his unique and unmatched services to the cause of Rizalism and constructive nationalism," making himself "a worthy descendant and torch-bearer of our country's foremost patriot in the observance of whose teachings lies the true essence of dynamic Filipinism as well as the intellectual independence and progress of the Filipino people." Read the citation:

"Claro Mayo Recto, eminent son of Tiaong, Quezon; Bachelor of Arts from the Ateneo de Manila, Bachelor and Master of Laws from the pontifical University of Santo Tomas, Doctor of Laws, *honoris causa*, from the University of Manila and the Arellano University; distinguished poet, orator, and scholar; outstanding parliamentarian, leader, jurist, and statesman; President of the Philippine Constitutional Convention and chief architect of the constitutional edifice it built; Associate Justice of the Philippine Supreme Court, member of the Spanish Royal Academy of Jurisprudence and Legislation, and twice the Philippines' nominee to the International Court of Justice; true, assertive, and uncompromising guardian and defender of Philippine sovereignty and national prestige and dignity." A friend of his would surely comment: "He is all that, and more."

# # #

INTROITO*

Por Fernando Ma. Guerrero

This is the forest primeval . . .

Estas palabras de Longfellow, olorosas á primavera y á jardín en flor, dicen bien á la cabesa de este libro de versos, de este devocionario lírico de uno de los más jóvenes poetas de Filipinas: Claro M. Recto.

Porque estamos, lector discretísimo y amable, en plena floresta poética, asistiendo, con un fulgor de asombro en los ojos, al primer desahogo cordial de una juventud de veintiún años, de una vida crismada con los óleos de la Belleza,—ministros oficiantes el propio esfuerzo y el enamoramiento íntimo del poeta—en la encantada y resplandeciente besílica del Arte. Porque resulta, mujer que me lees, que á poco que vuelvas la cara, te deslumbrará la visión del Ensueño traducido en estrofas, y á poco que alargues la mano, tropezarán tus dedos con unas rosas gráciles, balsámicas y hechiceras, rosas que se han abierto en la gloria de una hora sentimental, á la luz de un sol nativo, entre los susurros de una fuente que, brotando de lo más hondo de un pecho, vuelva sus aguas armoniosas sobre las asperezas del vivir y los prosaismos de esta edad del dóllar, del "trust" y de la praxis.

Ya estamos cansados de ese pontificado de utilitarismos áridos. Nuestro paladar está seco; nuestros ojos, adoloridos. Tantos ya son los materiales apilados de la vida externa y tan exíguo y flojo del dón de asimilarlos á las leyes internas de la naturaleza humana, que es necesario, para el triunfo del espíritu y la supervivencia de la emoción calológica, dar el grito de alarma á las conciencias abotagadas, sacudir con los sones de la lira, en crescendos estimulantes, el aplanamiento de la pobre sensibilidad, y pensar con Shelley que cuando el cálculo ha ganado la delantera á la facultad de concebir y el cuerpo ha llegado á ser pesado en demasía para el espíritu que le anima, es indispensable entonces inmergir el alma en las ondas suavísimas y puras de la Poesía. "La Poesía redime de toda flaqueza las visitaciones de la divinidad al hombre. La Poesía hace amables todas las cosas; exalta la belleza aún de aquello que ya es muy hermoso, y llena de belleza aún lo más disforme; une la exaltación y el horror, el agravio y el placer, la eternidad y la mudanza; sujeta á unión bajo su yugo de luz todas las cosas irreconciliables. Trasmuta cuanto toca, y toda forma que se mueve dentro del radio de su presencia, se trueca por maravillosa simpatía en encarnación del espíritu que alienta en ella; su secreta alquimia cambia en oro potable las ponsoñosas aguas que fluyen de la muerte á través de la vida; arranca del mundo el velo de la costumbre y muestra pura la desnuda y dormida belleza, que es el espíritu de sus formas."

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* This is the introduction to Recto's book of poetry, *Bajo los Cocoteros* (Manila, Libreria "Manila Filatélica," 1911). Guerrero was one of the foremost Filipino poets in Spanish.

Por eso, cuando aparecen libros tan impregnados en un aroma de belleza y devoción á la vida, como éste que Recto nos ofrece, figúraseme que una mano celeste y luminosa, mojada en el agua de las lustraciones, se posa en nuestras frentes entristecidas, y limpia, una á una, las salpicaduras de fango que, durante la jornada, han afeado y manchado nuestra carne...

Recto es esencialmente un poeta lírico. Es de una naturaleza á la vez sonriente y meditativa. Escrutándole el rostro, buceando en la expresión de su mirada, descubrimos al punto como eflorescencia típica de su carácter, la propensión al Ensueño, fuente y raíz de las más sutiles inspiraciones poéticas. Gran cazador de quimeras, se pasa la vida contemplándolas hasta tropezar con la preferida y cautívala en las redes de oro de su fantasía, la mima en las soledades de su corazón, y cuando ya la ha bañado en la piscina del sentimiento, y le ha vestido con la seda y el terciopelo de la palabra, la deja otra vez en libertad para que vuele á su arbitrio como una mariposa de colores, para que se emborrache de sol y se harte de luna, y voltejee luego, llena de lumbres y sonoridades, por sobre nuestras aficiones y anhelos, malferidos y amargados en el tumulto de las Babeles modernas.

Yo le conocí á este excelso poeta hace dos años. Confieso que sus primeros versos no me indujeron á pensar en la exis-

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tencia de filones áureos; sus composiciones iniciales, medio ankilosadas por las rigideces clásicas y los tópicos del santoral y el martirologio, no rebasaban el nivel ordinario de los "renglones cortos" que todos escribimos de estudiantes. Pero es justo confesar también que, sacudido el yugo escolar y rotas las influencias de la disciplina jesuítica, el numen de Recto, frente á la visión de la vida y á la brillante coloración del paisaje filipino, trocó sus breves alas por las egregias plumas aquilinas, y en vez de ensavar el vuelo en ambientes de noñez y santurronería, escaló las cumbres más altas de la idea y las excelsitudes del sentimiento, y en tan sagrado ejercicio, que es placer de dioses y delectación de almas privilegiadas, halló los motivos de su renovación literaria y la garantía de que sus caminos, desobstaculizados y francos, le llevaban derechamente á la posesión de un eclecticismo temático y de una técnica nueva, emancipada del lastre de rutinas paleontológicas, por la libertad métrica, la flexibilidad del ritmo y la novedad de las formas del pensamiento.

Estos progresos realizados por la musa de Claro M. Recto, son su mejor ejecutoria.

¿Se ha modernizado el poeta? . . . Pienso lealmente que sí, si por modernismo se ha de entender la tendencia contemporánea de convertir la Poesía en reflexion integral de lo subjetivo y objetivo, de lo formal é ideológico, para adaptarla plenamente lo mismo á los aspectos de la realidad visible que á los más ocultos matices y vibraciones del sentimiento.

No tiene Recto una concepción equivocada del modernismo en Literatura. No pone en el escarceo neologista la característica del verso de estos días, ni trata de embozar, por modo cabalístico y sibilino, lo que piensa y siente, lo que ensueña y evoca, bajo los crespones del símbolo, impenetrable como la sombra. Su procedimiento mental es de los menos complejos y alambicados. Responde, sin duda alguna, á la normalidad orgánica de un cerebro, claro como el mismo nombre del vate, y á un poder natural de percepción y videncia de las cosas circunstantes. Por tendencia innata, gusta su numen de pararse ante lo real y tangible y de inquirir, una vez enfocada la inspiración, primero la totalidad de las facetas y luego la más especial, culminante y expresiva de éstas, con lo que logra obtener una síntesis poética en que triunfa gloriosamente lo Bello, en la apoteosis de su unidad y universalidad, de su abstracción y concreción.

Si fuéramos á escrutar la sensibilidad de este poeta, la hallaríamos comparable á una fina caja armónica, á la clásica arpa eolia, vibrando suavemente á los besos más imperceptibles del aire. No diría Max Nordau anormal y enfermiza esta receptividad emotiva, este delicado y perenne estremecimiento de los nervios, esta leve palpitación de todo el sér bajo las bondades de la luna, los chisporroteos del sol, las gracias de la primavera, las seducciones del amor, las tristezas de la Patria, las confidencias del agua y los besos de la mujer querida. Recto es "humano, demasiado humano"; tiene su alma ligada, como en promesa de por vida, al alma de todas las cosas. Así esplende en sus poemas una vaga adoración panteista, sobre todo en aquellos que traducen su emoción y su fervor psíquico por los sortilegios y encantos del país natal.

Originariamente, la poesía de Recto, atenta á los modelos clásicos é influida por lugares comunes de otros climas, se ofrecía á la crítica como empedrada de exotismos literarios, que iban desde el símil y el tropo á la imagen y la alegoría. Por fortuna para las musas indígenas, esta orientación retórica ha cedido definitivamente el paso y el sitio á la predilección por una forma ungida en la luminosidad y policromía de nuestra propia naturaleza, en la graficidad de las comparaciones y metáforas que sugiere la magia del paisaje filipino, que es excepcional, porque es como cosa de ensueño, de encantamiento y de milagro.

Y como este paisaje es enorme, es múltiple, es suntuoso y es iridiscente, la métrica de Recto ha tenido que armonizarse con tan bizarras ostentaciones de lineamiento y de luz, y así el verso de arte menor—infrecuente en el antifonario del poeta—ha quedado poco menos que preterido y vencido por la amplitud silábica y la solemnidad rítmica y musical del alejandrino.

El verso de este portalira es de una flexibilidad maravillante. Es como una túnica de seda que acusase las más tenues morbideces de la idea y los latidos más recónditos del sentimiento. Ondula fluvialmente, se mece con la sonoridad de un palayal, y se recoge y expande á tenor de la sístole y la diástole del estro. Con esta técnica flexuosa, no hay modalidad del pensar ni aspecto sentimental que no halle cabida y entronque en el molde armonioso y melódico del verso; y fiel á este procedimiento, Recto consigue el máximum de placer en quien le lee, por el sabio consorcio de la ideación artística y de la justeza y melodía del verbo.

Recto es un enamorado de la cadencia pura, de las cesuras sabiamente puestas, aunque su distribución esté en desacuerdo con las pragmáticas rigurosas de la poética de los clásicos. ¿Qué importa la divergencia? Lo indispensable es que haya musicalidad y que el número y la cadencia del verso sean propiamente la resonancia inequívoca de las fluctuaciones del raudal patético y los vaivenes de nuestra vida interior. Por lo demás, toda técnica, según Vigié-Lecocq, es perfectamente libre, y la poesía no ha de dar, más que las otras artes, cuenta estrechísima de sus procedimientos. Si un poeta ha logrado comunicarnos su emoción y refrescar nuestra alma con un hálito de vida, sería una ingratitud y hasta una injusticia discutir y condenar su métrica. Su libertad es su derecho.

Ya lo dijo Horacio:

. . . Pictoribus atque poetis
quidlibet audendi semper fuit oequa potestas.

Nada tan plausible en la ya copiosa labor de este joven poeta, como su idolatria dentro del inmenso ciclo de sus asuntos y temas por aquellos que le llevan al oido, en la hora del *afflatus dei*, la voz íntima y materna de negar hasta ahora el fuego y el agua de la libertad. El poeta está como saturado y macerado en esas desconsolanzas del terruño, y así, hasta cuando objetiva en el metal sonoro de su estrofa la visión feérica del paisaje filipino, su poesía, cuando no es ideal lacrimatorio, tiene detonaciones de protesta y restallidos sibilantes de fusta, aunque no es raro que á veces la elegía y el yambo vayan como del brazo por la encantadora floresta del poema. Me seduce esta musa cálida, insumisa y debeladora. Sus arranques patrióticos y sus conminaciones pungentes son como recordatorios á la Raza, dichos desde las cúspides más altas y bellas del alma y la conciencia filipinas. En esta categoría de asuntos, las estancias de Recto son, según la frase de Shelley, *trompetas que llaman á la batalla.*

Frente á la Naturaleza del trópico, el numen de Recto aparece como sumido en la dulzura del éxtasis. No se entretiene en nimiedades, no pone su celo en la sorpresa de los pormenores visibles, sino que capta la fisonomía del conjunto, la idealiza en la alquitara de su temperamento y nos la da luego, no en copia servil, sino en forma de una impresión quintaesenciada, donde refulge y canta, en la gama infinita de sus colores y armonías el alma entera y autóctona del paisaje.

El estilo del poeta fluye irisado como el nácar de nuestros mares; su fraseología se expande en rompimientos de aurora, de pirotecnia celeste; las imágenes desfilan en fogosos escapes líricos, y la música del metro se acentúa placenteramente como acompañamiento acordado de la exaltación cordial y el cariño sin mancha á las cosas del Hogar y de la Raza.

En la expresión de sus cuitas amorosas, se nos revela emotivo, romántico y fetiquista. A las veces, por sobre la urdimbre de los versos y el ensarte de las ideas, pasa una ráfaga de sensualidad, llena de vaguedades y de temblores enigmáticos. Pero es sólo un momento: la carne refrena sus ímpetus y se detiene en los dinteles del Arte, para no estobar la letanía florida y sentimental del poeta á la diosa de ojos negros y manos delicadas y mórbidas: su diosa.

En resumen, Recto, á pesar de su juventud, es de una inspiración múltiple y fácilmente adaptable á los proteismos del mundo en que vivimos y del otro que llevamos dentro. Podrá tener sus lunares como el mismo augusto Helios, padre de la luz y ojo del universo; pero le corresponde, por derecho propio y méritos contraidos en el campo literario, un sitio de honor entre los cultores altísimos de la poesía, del "mas infalible heraldo, compañero y seguidor del despertar de un gran pueblo que se dispone á realizar un cambio en la opinión ó en las instituciones."

De intento no he disecado ni analizado este inicial puñado de rosas y gemas que el poeta confía á la curiosidad de las gentes. Doyles el florilegio en su gloriosa virginidad. Así no podrán achacarme nunca el pecado triste de haber roto corolas ni extraido artificiosamente perfumes. Mi norma es ésta: indemnidad para la ilusión, y para la sed de Belleza toda suerte de estimulantes.

Así como así, la dorada cancela del jardín va á abrirse dentro de poco. Cuando ingreséis en él y os perdáis espiritualmente por sus vereditas blancas y sus flores de maravilla, os visitará, como á mí, el Ensueño misericorde, y entonces pensaréis instintivamente que aunque la vida es amarga y universal el sufrimiento, todavía hay sobre las aguas muertas y sombrías, un puente de luz para quien guste de emociones puras y desee regenerarse en la santa y escondida piscina de la Poesía . . .

Poeta egregio: antes de dejaros solo con vuestra zampoña lírica, sonréido de las musas míticas—y de las de carne y hueso también—y antes de que otra vez os subáis al azul sobre las ancas del corcel divino, permitidme que os diga como Kanva á Sakuntala:

—"¡Que sea feliz tu viaje! ¡Que la extensión del camino la alegren claros estanques, siempre cubiertos de loto! ¡Que te den sombra los árboles! ¡Que el viento te refrigere con su caricia suave! ¡Que nunca huelle tu planta más que pétalos fragantes! . . . . .

Y ahora, lectores míos, emborrachaos, *bajo los cocoteros*, con vino de inmortal belleza.

This is the forest primeval . . .

# # #

OUR CONSTITUTION*

I. Of Amendments and Tenure of Office

Our Constitution is a living thing. Since, in the words of its preamble, it should embody the ideals of the Filipino people, it must perforce grow and change to fit the natural growth and change of those ideals. Indeed, have we not, if the various plebiscites and electoral tests held in the past are reliable expressions of the popular will, generously expanded our conception of how to conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation? And have we not also amended even our ideal of liberty and independence which was once held incompatible with the quartering of foreign troops under a foreign flag on our sovereign soil?

The fourteen years that have elapsed since the charter was signed have witnessed striking examples of this subtle process of evolution, for good or ill, spontaneous or otherwise. The Constitution underwent its first changes in 1940 when, in terms of human life, it had scarcely attained the use of reason and the knowledge or original sin. Now it is nearing the age of puberty and certain significant transformations indicate that it is nearing, at least, a change of voice.

It seems to be a good time to see how the Constitution has weathered the shock of war, the corrosion—still incalculable—of enemy invasion and occupation, the realities of independence, and, surprisingly even of more importance, the slow wear and tear of human ambition.

How well has the Constitution aged? Should it be further amended to promote the general welfare more effectively in an atomic age when two worlds are racing toward a hidden climax? Has the national experience justified the amendments that have already been made? These are questions that we may find it profitable to explore.

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Three principal revisions have already been made in the original charter, namely, the amendment allowing the reelection of the President and his service as such for eight consecutive years, the amendment restoring the bicameral system of Congress with the creation of a Senate elected at large, and the amendment granting American citizens and corporations the same rights as Filipino citizens and corporations in the utilization of our natural resources.

The reasons that led the Constitutional Convention to outlaw the reelection of the President are familiar. Briefly, we sought to prevent the perpetuation of the personal power of any one man. We sought to protect the Republic, and the man himself, from the temptations of personal ambition and partisan convenience. It was our reasoned hope that a Chief Executive, prevented from suceeding himself, would, once in office, dedicate himself entirely to the fulfillment of his high duties, to the leadership of the whole nation, without being distracted or hampered by those cynical calculations of tactical advantage which are the occupational disease of politicians.

That the reasoning of the Convention was not without merit was shown by the reaction of one man who, more than any other in modern history, was to be intimately engrossed with the problem. President Franklin D. Roosevelt defied the oldest American political tradition to run for a third term, and a fourth, both of which he won. But when he congratulated the Convention and myself on the occasion of the formal submission of our Constitution to him in Washington, he did not hesitate to single out the prohibition against Presidential reelection as "one of the best features of your Constitution."

Unfortunately the original intent of the Convention was never tested. The prohibition against Presidential reelection was amended out of the Constitution in 1940, before the expiration of the Constitutional six-year term of the first President of the Commonwealth.

I do not propose to rehearse at this time the arguments that were advanced for and against the amendment at the time it was proposed. I should like only to make my own position clear.

I was never in favor of the amendment and when I was asked by President Quezon, in a private breakfast-conference in Malacañan, to support it, I declined. I urged President Quezon then to consider that posterity would be led to conclude that he had allowed the amendment to materialize for selfish personal reasons, when he and I knew that he had higher motives. But President Quezon was never a man to be frightened out of his convictions by the fear of present or future criticism.

When I left for the United States on a trip for my health shortly before the plebiscite on the amendment, the President again requested me to at least issue a statement from abroad supporting the revision of the Constitution. I told him then what I still feel. I said that, on the one hand, I could not come out in favor of the amendment because I personally was against it on principle, because the Convention had thoroughly discussed so fundamental and common a Constitutional problem and had decided against Presidential reelection, and because I did not want it to be said that the Convention under my presidency had so neglected to explore and weigh all the aspects of the issue that, in the short time which had elapsed, our thought and decision could be so easily overturned. On the other hand, I declared that I was averse to openly opposing the revision because it might be thought unseemly and presumptuous on my part to stand in the way of a movement to amend the Constitution drafted under my leadership.

I have never considered the Constitution of 1935 a perfect instrument but I believe that President Quezon himself would now have had reason to regret the amendment on Presidential reelection. He was a true and sincere patriot, and withal a political genius, and it would have disturbed him deeply to see the consequences of 1940 in the politics of 1949.

Human nature, for all its inaccessible profundities, is predictable to a certain extent. And it should not be cause for either wonderment or dismay that the successors of President Quezon, denied the advantages of his unchallenged leadership, should have found themselves saddled, reined and spurred by the political imperatives of reelection. Our national experience has amply justified the apprehensions of the Convention.

Incumbent presidents, under the spell of the polls, have been compelled, with more or less resistance, to suffer dishonesty and corruption, to flatter reaction and bargain with sedition, to neglect the clear call of statesmanship for the insistent whispers of party and faction, to woo regionalism, to bully, bluff, and bluster, to hang their heads in silence when they should have denounced, to bring the government closer to the electorate and the electorate closer to the treasury.

Nor is there any available evidence to believe that the restriction to eight consecutive years in office—an artificial and labored compromise with the original intent of the Convention which neither minimizes politics nor insures continuity of leadership—should eliminate these evils. No President of the Philippines has yet served out the full span alloted to him by the revised charter. President Quezon died in wartime; President Osmeña failed to win reelection; and President Roxas died in the first half of his first term.

Death could not be amended out of the Constitution.

II. On Responsible Government

Our Constitution was frankly an imitation of the American charter. Many of the delegates were products of an American system of education and consequently were obsessed with the sincere belief that democracy could be defined only in American terms.

I remember that I found it impossible to shake this odd devotion in President Roxas, who was then a delegate to the Convention, even on a point which seemed, to me at least, to be beyond argument. We were considering the Constitutional provision vesting in the Congress "the sole power to declare war."

I observed that the Congress should instead be given the sole power to declare "the existence of a state of war," since a declaration of war was manifestly inconsistent with our Declaration of Principles, one of which precisely renounced war as an instrument of national policy. It was my opinion then, as it is now, that, on the basis of such a renunciation, we could not declare war but only recognize its existence if we were attacked or war declared against us.

President Roxas, however, insisted that the American Constitution used the phrase "to declare war" and that consequently we should adopt it also, since our courts would be guided mainly by American legal precedents which were based on the American Constitution's language. Our disagreement occurred during the closing days of the session and I was not inclined to leaving the presidential chair to argue the point formally on the floor of the Convention, but the incident had a curious sequel of considerable historical significance, which none of us foresaw.

When President Laurel's cabinet was compelled to consider the Japanese demand for a declaration of war by the occupation Republic in 1944, I found the phrase which I had originally sponsored for our Constitution the perfect expression of our completely passive attitude. At my suggestion, therefore, the Laurel government proclaimed "the existence of a state of war." President Roxas, who had agreed that rejection of the Japanese demand was impossible, did not object this time to the use of the expression. The Japanese for their part, while revising other expressions of mine which left unnamed the alleged aggressors of the Republic, were less perceptive of the shades of Constitutional language.

The educational background and intellectual loyalty of numerous delegates were not the only factors that made our Constitution American even in its details. The Convention as a whole aslo realized that its work would have to be submitted for approval to an American President, consciously or unconsciously committed to the preservation of American patterns and institutions in his nation's democratic experiment in the East.

Necessarily, therefore, the Philippine presidency became a copy of the American presidency, with its vast concentration of powers and only periodical accountability to the people. Like the man in the White House, the man in Malacañan is now safe from immediate responsibility. And like the men on Capitol Hill, the men on Taft and Lepanto do not have to render accounts for the fixed limits of their terms. A bad President and a bad Congress may not, in Lincoln's phrase, fool all of the people all of the time. But they can make fools of the people—and they can make fools of themselves—for at least four years.

Only God and impeachment can remove the President from his high office, no matter how incompetent or dangerous he may have proved himself to be in the eyes of the majority of the electorate. He may quarrel with his Congress, whose members have been changed by a revulsion of the popular will, as President Truman was forced to cope with the 80th Congress of the United States. Or the Congress may rebel against him and systematically obstruct his administration as the legislature of the Commonwealth under Roxas rebelled against President Osmeña after liberation.

But the issue must remain unresolved for the duration of their arbitrary terms. Neither the President nor the Congress may be changed although these two active powers of government may be stifling the nation in a stubborn and unbreakable deadlock.

I do not recall any considerable discussion in the Constitutional Convention on this ancient and persistent problem of governmental responsibility. I believe we were too deeply under the spell of the American system to give much thought to any alternative. But now that we have presumably been freed by the declaration of our independence from the schoolboy complexes and political misgivings that restrained the Convention, the Filipino people may soberly consider the system which another democratic tradition, of equal validity and certainly of greater maturity than the American, has followed to harness the power of government to the will of the people.

In Britain, which is commonly acknowledged to be the world's oldest democracy and its most stable and trustworthy. as well as in the great majority of democratic states outside of the western hemisphere, the government is directly and immediately responsible to the popular chamber, which may be made equally and just as promptly responsible to the people. The President or King is head of the state. He reigns but he does not govern. He appoints the premier and his ministers; he convenes, adjourns, or dissolves parliament; pardons are issued, treaties are signed, laws are promulgated, appointments are made, and war is declared, in his name. But the formulation and implementation of the policies and programs which he formally executes are in the hands of the prime minister and his government or cabinet.

Under this arrangement Congress and the real and active executive work together in intimate partnership, immediately sensitive to public opinion. Congress may repudiate the prime minister and his government in one day if they should prove themselves unworthy of confidence; or they may be retained without limit of time by successive Congresses renovated at general elections. A harassed administration obstructed by an irreconcilable legislature, or a parliamentary minority confident of winning a majority from the electorate, can take their case to the people without delay and at the proper time, by obtaining a dissolution of Congress and new elections. The President himself may be allowed the power to dissolve in order to bring an unworthy Congress promptly before the bar of the people.

If I have been attracted lately to the parliamentary system, it has been due principally to this characteristic of immediate responsibility. Our political experience since liberation has been marked by many crises which would have been resolved one way or the other, more justly and more expeditiously than they were, if we had been able to exact prompt accountability from the administrations that have been in power.

The issue of collaboration could have been swiftly settled by the people if Congress had been dissolved and a general election called upon the restoration of law and order. Instead it was perforce allowed to divide and distress the nation until the final amnesty. The official policy toward the armed peasant movement in Luzon was never submitted to debate until the proclamation of amnesty to the members of the Hukbalahap last year, and even then neither the policy of attraction nor the policy of repression was taken to the people.

If either of the two amnesties had been rejected by the Congress, or if the pact on military bases had been repudiated as incompatible with our sovereignty and safety, there would have been no prompt solution available to the impasse and our national policy on these transcendental issues would have had to remain an enigma floating in a vacuum.

Other democratic peoples can visit swift retribution on official misconduct. Our hands are tied until the next election. In the interim the administration remains securely in the seat of power, wrapped in an impenetrable ambiguity which is equally unfair to accusers and accused, to the people and their leaders. Our Congress cannot, like the British Parliament, cause the fall of an indiscreet minister who has unwittingly revealed the details of new tax proposals. Our Congress cannot even, like the French parliament in the gigantic Stavisky scandals in 1939 or the Japanese Diet recently, withdraw its confidence from a cabinet member accused of accepting bribes.

The problem of democratic government is not insoluble but we should not be so complacent as to believe that we have solved it. A neutral Chief Executive free to enforce the law without the political tactics looking toward reelection, a Government or Cabinet immediately sensitive and responsible to public opinion, a Congress accountable to the people without delay, constitute an alternative system to ours which should command our earnest consideration in these times when even the slow and patient turtle of public opinion has outrun the justice we thought swift.

III. More on Responsible Government

The American presidential system of government originally established under our Constitution and reenforced by the amendment allowing Presidential reelection has, it now appears, worsened an endemic disease in our body politic. That system has worked in the United States on the basis of an alternation of parties, more or less regularly, with both majority and minority maintaining themselves as effective organizations, in and out of power.

Even in the United States, however, the unforeseen accumulation of vast powers in the Presidency as a consequence of the critical demands of the modern concepts of war and social peace is threatening to throw the political pendulum out of balance. The Republican party in that country has just lost its fifth successive presidential election, and is in such a state of disorganization that it was reduced during the Dewey campaign to use the same fatal "me too" tactics which ruined Willkie.

Under our Constitution the Presidency is potentially even more powerful. I do not believe it an exaggeration to state that the President of the Philippines could easily convert himself into an actual dictator within the framework of the charter. With his control of local governments and all that signifies in terms of elections, with huge sums and unlimited sinecures to distribute, with emergency powers to rule by executive decree as a last resort, he is restrained only by his own conscience from perpetuating himself or his party in power. But our poor human conscience often prevents us from doing only what we do not want to do.

When we consider our national political experience, the situation of democracy in this country assumes even more alarming aspects. I believe I can say with confidence that no minority party in the Philippines has ever unseated a majority party by its on efforts. I write as one who is an oppositionist by temperament and inclination. I entered politics as a member of the minority and I am acquainted from my own intimate experience with the problems involved. And I know that, even without the heightened odds under our Constitution, the chances were always against any effective operation here of the American alternation of parties.

A change of power in the Philippines has occurred only when there was a split in the majority. United, the majority has always been invincible. The Nacionalista Party, which won our first popular elections, remained in power until Quezon broke with Osmeña. It was only when the Nacionalistas were thus divided into *Colectivistas* and *Unipersonalistas* that the Democrata Party obtained a plurality in the legislature. When the two wings joined in the Nacionalista Consolidado Party, the opposition was again condemned to futility.

The next opportunity was offered when Quezon and Osmeña split for the second time over the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act. This time I considered it the better strategy to dissolve the minority altogether in order to take better and more lasting advantage of the division in the majority and I therefore took the initiative in putting an end to the old Democrata Party. The members of the latter then joined forces with either the Pro or the Anti wings of the Nacionalista Party. But once again the majority was reunited and the minority groups that emerged, even when loosely gathered in a *Frente Popular*, proved powerless to win even a single seat in the last Congress before the war.

The opposition since the war has been, of course, the result of a third division in the ranks of the majority. And it must be admitted that, as usual, its best chance to win, and perhaps its only chance, is in another split in the majority.

Our political experience therefore is totally different from, on the one hand, the American alternation in power of enduring and effective parties, and, on the other hand, the political disorganization of some countries where there is a chaos of small parties, each unable by itself to gain and retain power. Our tendency has always been toward the consolidation and absorption of parties, and the danger toward our democracy has been the discouragement and dissolution of the minority after defeat, a defeat that, under our present system, seems to be irretrievable.

The combination of a majority free from responsibility to the people for a fixed term, and with rich opportunities for consolidating its power, together with a Presidency endowed with vast powers which the incumbent has every reason to wield for political advantage since he can run for reelection, has stunted and deformed our body politic. It has put a premium on servility and opportunism. It has pampered every unhealthy appetite and tendency of our national politics.

The remedy, I have suggested in a previous article, may lie in a parliamentary system of government which would not only allow the people to exact immediate accountability from the government but also, as a logical converse, oblige the members of the government to cultivate responsibility.

Under such a system the President would retain enough of his powers to enable him to act as an effective arbiter, an arbiter moreover who would have more reason to be neutral since he would not be eligible for reelection. The active government would be in the hands of a prime minister and ministers selected from the Congress and immediately responsible and accountable to it. Since we now have a bicameral legislature, the cabinet could be drawn from either house and would be subject to the confidence of both, an unfavorable vote in either being sufficient to cause its fall.

Undoubtedly parliamentary government has its dangers and drawbacks. It demands a greater degree of maturity and sense of responsibility in the people. It widens the opportunities for the barter of legislative votes and encourages the formation of factions to bargain with the balance of power. In some countries it has rendered the tenure of power and the continuity of administration so precarious that it has paralyzed effective government. I do not think however that our political scientists will find it impossible to devise safeguards against these dangers, especially since our political tendencies are precisely toward consolidation rather than fragmentation of political groups.

The advantages to be gained, on the other hand, deserve our serious consideration. A parliamentary system would make our government, as I have pointed out, more sensitive to public opinion. It would shake the cynical confidence of the majority that, for a fixed term of four years at least, it will be secure and free to entrench itself and that afterward it will be too late for any opposition to make an effective challenge. It would, above all, stimulate and broaden the minds of our legislators for they would have opportunity to participate actively in the formulation and execution of national policies.

I am afraid that under our present system the individual members of Congress has little incentive to study national problems. He has neither voice nor vote in their solution, for he can neither aspire to be a member of the cabinet which prepares the program of the administration, nor withhold his vote in its support lest he be permanently deprived of the patronage at the exclusive disposal of that administration.

He is therefore reduced to the primitive level of survival. His politics are the personal politics of reelection. If he can make himself impregnable within his narrow bailiwick, he is content. He knows that beyond its confines there is no prize commensurate with the trouble of thinking for himself and the risk of acting on his own conviction. In actual practice the art of modern government consists in the automatic enactment into law of the theories of executive specialists who, technically proficient though they may be, have no direct authority from the people. It is the leadership of the incompetent by the irresponsible.

The people for their part are prevented from developing full political maturity. The issues which they are periodically called upon to decide are, for the most part, meaningless contests in personal popularity. The meat of national policy is deemed too strong for them and they are fed so long on the pap of superficialities that they never grow teeth.

IV. On the Vice-President and the Senate

A contemporary discussion of the executive and legislative powers under our Constitution would not be complete without including the Vice-Presidency and the Senate, both of which have, separately or jointly, been the subjects of recent comment. This newspaper has openly advocated the revision of the Constitution to make the Vice-President the presiding officer of the Senate, as in the United States. In the Congress itself and in political circles, the feeling has always remained strong that the Senate should be elected from regional districts instead of by the nation at large.

The Vice-Presidency was a topic of disagreement even in the Convention, and I do not think it detracts from the merits of its labor to reveal that the question was decided mainly in view of the political situation existing at that time. A live and sensitive Constitution must, after all, reflect actual conditions.

It will be recalled that the Convention was called shortly after a bitter election contested by the Pro and Anti groups of the former majority and minority parties. The customary process of consolidation was already under way but it was still far from complete. The possibility was not remote that the fight would be resumed on a national scale in the first elections due under the Commonwealth.

Many patriotic leaders on both sides, however, looked with misgivings upon such a renewal of hostilities. They were persuaded that, for the highest reasons of national prestige, the first elections for a Filipino President should be conducted and decided on a lofty level of bipartisan coalition. A ticket uniting the leaders of the two parties seemed to be the logical way to achieve this end and proposals were already being made to give President Quezon the uncontested nomination for the Presidency of the Commonwealth.

Partisan feelings, however, were still running high in the Convention, a fact of which I had reason to be aware since I was accused by my fellow-Antis of being partial to the Pros. Consequently there was fierce opposition to the creation of a Vice-Presidency to which, it was expected, Senator Osmeña would be nominated. That opposition was eventually won over but it has left its mark on the futility.

The opponents of Senator Osmeña would never have consented to a Vice-President with any real powers. The leader of the opposition was left completely at the mercy of the President who might or might not see fit to name him even to his cabinet. I have often thought that Osmeña's acceptance of the Vice-Presidential nomination under those circumstances was the best evidence of his genuine modesty and lack of personal ambition.

To this date the Vice-Presidency of the Philippines is an empty honor, and neither the Republic nor the Constitution would, in my opinion, lose by its abolition. The succession to the Presidency can be adequately handled by leaving the choice to the Congress. The selection of the succeeding President by this means would certainly reflect more accurately the fitness of the victor to his high office. No one votes for a Vice-President with the immediate thought that he will become President.

As it is now, the Vice-Presidency is principally a political device. It enables a party to assuage personal ambition and to widen its electoral appeal to regional prejudice. But as a means of determining the people's choice of their leader in the event of the President's death, it is inferior even to the old American system, followed until 1804, of giving the Vice-Presidency to the candidate receiving the second largest number of votes.

The proposal to make the Vice-President the President of the Senate, as in the United States, could not, of course, be considered by the Convention since the original Constitution did not provide for an upper house in the Congress. I doubt moreover that it would have prospered at the time the amendment restoring a bicameral legislature was proposed since the Vice-Presidency was still occupied by Osmeña, against whom there always remained the alert jealousy and fear which his qualities as a statesman aroused.

Present and past political history has also shown the great power vested in the Presidency of the Senate, from which all of our elected Presidents have risen. Human nature and our political breeding being what they are, I would certainly be surprised by any President in office who would deliberately or willingly allow his presumptive successor to wax so great.

It is indeed an unfortunate commentary on our political tradition that the growth of national leaders has been so infrequent and so retarded by political distrust and jealousy. When the amendment to establish an upper house in the Congress was proposed, I had hoped that the situation would be remedied by the provision making the Senate elected at large by the entire nation. The lamentable system of block-voting, however, frustrated this fundamental purpose of the new Senate.

A significant development in the first election of the new Senators revealed the danger clearly. One of my most esteemed colleagues on the majority ticket was former Justice Norberto Romualdez, who had also taken a role of prudent guidance in the Convention. He died suddenly the day before the polls and the name of Governor Rafael Martinez was hastily added to the ticket to complete it. Our party swept the election.

I had my personal reasons to rejoice at the result for I was honored with the highest number of votes received by any of the distinguished candidates. But I still recall the misgivings that oppressed me at the time. I had the greatest respect for Governor Martinez and, if the war had not intervened, I am sure he would have performed his duties creditably. But I could not escape the realization that he had never campaigned, that his name had never been mentioned as a candidate and that the people could not possibly have known him to be a candidate in the one short day between the death of Justice Romualdez and the election, and yet he had been elected. He had been elected by grace of the block-voting system. His personal qualifications, excellent as they were—his identity itself—had not mattered.

I am not against the retention of the Senate as created under the Constitutional amendments of 1940. I believe that we must develop national leaders and that the election of a Senate at large is an excellent means to do so. But if the Senate is to have any significance, if it is to achieve any purpose other than to consolidate partisan power by flattering regionalism and pressure groups of all descriptions, election to it must rest on the merits of the individual candidates rather than blind party discipline. So long as the block-voting system remains, we shall be making, not national leaders, but creatures of the party and dummies of its powerful leader.

V. On the Electoral Commission and Supreme Court

The author of that pious sentiment, "the voice of the people is the voice of God," was probably not acquainted with the refinements of modern political ventriloquism. It is an art however with which we are not unfamiliar. Consequently one of the most disturbing and ominous characteristics of our political experience has been the increasing distrust with which, rightly or wrongly, a growing proportion of our population has looked upon the electoral process.

The violent seizures of power which are so common in Latin American republics—the incurable habits of conspiracy, the brief bloody eruptions into the streets, the sudden pronunciamientos of military juntas—may be in great part due to the irresponsibility of government and the rigid unalterability of the term of office which have already been discussed as primary defects of the presidential system of government. But these explosions of public disorder may be due as much to the absence of clean and fair elections, or the failure of popular faith in their existence, as to impatience with a system that does not provide machinery for the transfer of power capable of functioning immediately and peacefully in response to the will of a new majority.

These considerations led the Convention to rise above the partisan interests of the majority of its members and to enact into the Constitution an innovation in governmental machinery.

But due to lack of time it was not possible to secure the ready conformity among the delegates on the form and manner of implementation as to embody the plan in the original Constitution, so the matter was left to future action by Congress. Fortunately a better opportunity came when six years later Quezon proposed to the National Assembly to amend the Constitution for the revival of the old system of bicameral Congress and allowing one reelection of the President on condition that his original term be reduced to four years and in no case was the entire term to exceed eight years. Such proposal furnished the occasion to include among the desired amendments the one establishing a Commission on Elections to form, as planned during Committee discussions at the Constitutional Convention, a constitutional body whose organization and freedom of action would be free from interference from the legislative and other departments of the government.

That Commission, according to this Constitutional Amendment, consists of three members with the relatively long term of office of nine years and removable only by impeachment. The Commission has "exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections" and decides, "save those involving the right to vote, all administrative questions affecting elections, including the determination of the number and location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and of other election officials." Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review by the Supreme Court.

It was the hope of the members of the Convention who originally planned it, that such a Commission would insure public faith and confidence in the fairness of elections and it is a fine tribute to their altruism and patriotism that they sacrificed the enormous political advantages that accrued to the majority under the old system which vested this decisive control in a member of the cabinet in power. Such hope, however, seems to have been defrauded and its sacrifice, wasted. Popular distrust in the reliability of our elections has never been so widespread

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or so tenacious as now, fourteen years after the approval of our Constitution and eight years after the establishment of what we had intended to be one of its most salutary creations.

Whether the presidential system is retained, therefore, or whether parliamentary government is introduced, and especially in the latter case in which elections will assume an even greater importance, the Constitutional safeguards against electoral fraud must be strengthened. Ultimately, of course, no people can be safeguarded from its own folly. Corruption and cowardice cannot be amended out of the Constitution. No legislation can be passed against human frailty. But it can be recognized and foreseen.

The thought suggests itself that perhaps the Commission has not been sufficiently removed from the control or persuasion of politics and that perhaps it should be elevated and fortified into what would be virtually a fourth power in government, a fourth estate. The members of the Commission might conceivably be given the rank and compensation of Justices of the Supreme Court, and its Chairman those of the Chief Justice, with similar life tenures of office terminable only by impeachment.

The head and members of the Supreme Court are, rightly and necessarily, as far removed from political influence as it is possible in a democracy, and there is as much reason to give the Commission on Elections an equal measure of independence and security. The electoral process is, after all, the indispensable condition for the due process of law.

There are undoubtedly other defects in the Constitutional machinery for popular representation. There is, for example, the odd omission in the Constitution of any provision for protests in a presidential election. But the basic and most significant failure of our efforts is that revealed in the increasing distrust of the electoral verdict.

I do not think any price would be too high to pay for the restoration of the people's faith in the sacredness and supremacy of their sovereign will. I believe that to achieve this end the Congress should even be willing to extend to the Commission the privilege which its two chambers extend to each other, of automatically approving, without question or reduction, its yearly appropriation for estimated expenditures.

Recent events have underlined the strategic importance of the power of the purse, and it would certainly be invigorating not only to public confidence but also to the self-reliance of the proper officials themselves to protect their budgets as well as their personal compensations from political blackmail. To make this protection more than a mere courtesy, it might even be provided in our Constitution that the yearly estimates of expenditures submitted by the Supreme Court and the Commission on Elections shall not be altered or reduced except by a definite proportion, say three-fourths, of the total vote of Congress.

A *grandes males, grandes remedios*, and if these proposals appear extreme, it should be remembered that the danger from public distrust in the electoral process and the administration of justice would also be extreme.

Financial independence is not, however, sufficient in the judicial power of government, and our realization of the need for a wider independence in our court has crystallized in contemporary proposals to give them also administrative autonomy. I am in full sympathy with the measure filed in the Senate placing inferior courts under the administrative authority of the Supreme Court. Indeed I would go further and suggest an amendment of the Constitution limiting the President's power to appoint all judges of inferior courts to those recommended by the Supreme Tribunal.

While the Americanism of the Convention did not extend so far as to make our Justices and judges elective, they are, under our present system, not entirely free from the necessity of playing politics. They are appointed by politicians; the appointments must be confirmed by other politicians; and it is humanly impossible to outlaw the natural disposition to repay one favor with another.

I can recall only a brief and cursory discussion in the Convention on this point. I believe it was argued, with considerable validity, that under such a system the Supreme Court would be so burdened with administrative work that it would be unable to attend properly to its main concern. In this matter, however, as in most, we must decide on the basis of the greater and the lesser evil and, at any rate, I cannot conceive that the appointment of inferior judges will ever become so frequent a task that it will seriously interfere with the duties of the Court. Certainly the Court should be recognized as much more qualified than the President or the Commission on Appointments to inquire impartially into the technical and moral qualifications of judges for their posts. The search for justice is hard enough without the false scent of political coquetry.

VI. On Constitutional Revision

The generation of 1935 will not soon forget the lofty exaltation, the sense of consecration and fulfillment, that possessed the national soul when the Convention completed the Constitution which the Filipino people took as the first visible embodiment of the independence and the ultimate security of the liberties they had so long pursued. Indeed, that spirit of general abnegation and dedication had presided over the entire historic process, had elevated the selection of the delegates above the level of partisan passion and calculation in the very midst of a rancorous struggle for power, had magically denied entrance at the doors of the Convention to personal and factional intrigue, ambition, jealousy and envy, and had imposed serenity, harmony, and wisdom upon deliberations that the delegates as well as the people they represented, recognized as transcending the brief moment they actually consumed in the eternal life of the people.

"Our optimism," I ventured to predict at the close of the Convention, "nurtures the expectation that (this Constitution) will emerge victorious from the ordeals to which it must submit under the pressure of new circumstances in the course of time.

"New generations will succeed the present, each with fresh ideals of its own and its own wealth of progress, augmented or diminished in the course of centuries of rise or decadence; time in its incessant course shall work on our present world its slow but inexorable renovation and destruction; and humanity, weary of itself and prey to new follies will again and once again fling the treasures of civilization into the flames of horrible wars yet to come." But, I said, future generations would surely judge that, in writing our Constitution, we had been driven not by narrow ambition but by the holy quest of the happiness of the people under the reign of God.

None of us then foresaw how horrible the ordeal would be, how thorough the destruction, how wild the folly, how near and familiar the horrible war that was to come. It is only fourteen years back to 1935 but how distant and strange already the world and the generation of that year appears.

Unforseen circumstances already exercise upon us unimagined pressures. The Commonwealth that was yet unborn when the Constitution was written is already dead. We have come to grips with the realities of independence. We have endured the rigors of war, the humiliation of defeat, and the frustration of enemy occupation. And from the debris of our programs of economic preparation for independence, from the ruins of many generations of progress and prosperity, we have seen the grim apparitions of corrupt scavengers and subversive banditry quarrel over the loot of a demoralized nation.

Time runs faster than we foresaw and its work of renovations and destruction has exceeded our worst fears. Our Constitution was written in a world where Wilsonian idealism still lingered, for a people that still fondly hoped in the unassailability of the dogma of self-determination, for an unborn Republic that was conceived in the faith that a small nation could avoid war by renouncing it and defend its liberties with the unaided valor of its citizens.

The illusions and assumptions of 1935 have today a bitter and ironic flavor. The two most powerful states of the world have found that neither enormous wealth nor the most vigilant discipline, neither the most advanced techniques in science nor the most ancient devices of tyranny, can assure their safety and even they must seek alliances with bribes and threats. Misery and a sense of new-found power have exacerbated the passions, have sharpened the indignation and impatience, of the dispossessed. The threat of revolution dismays those who once rested in the comfortable assurance that agitation could be assuaged with limited and leisurely reform. Neither within our borders nor without, in the rapacious and predatory world, have the premises of 1935 survived the challenge of Orani and the warning of Hiroshima.

The time seems to have come therefore to reexamine the foundations of our national life and to determine whether the Constitution of 1935 and 1940 fittingly embodies the ideals and satisfies the necessities of 1949. Our first presidential elections since the proclamation of our independence and the establishment of our sovereign Republic offer a singularly appropriate occasion for a new Constitutional Convention and I am inclined to consider Senate President Jose Avelino's proposal to call such a convention, made in a message to this newspaper on Constitution Day, particularly felicitous. The achievement of our independence and new trends in both our national political life and the relations among the states of the world combine with reasons of economy to justify a re-appraisal of our Constitution at this time.

I have faith in the capacity of our people to rise again above the partisan prejudices and passions of the day and to make the selection of the members of such a Convention on the basis of their fitness for the task, without undue consideration of the bitter political struggle that impends now as it did in 1935. I know that a new Convention will not fail to be inspired by a national feeling of that nature, to perform its duties with courage and vision.

Once the Constitution has been revised, however—if it should be found necessary to revise it—I believe that the process of amendment should be made more difficult to discourage personal ambition or factional interest from attempting to change the charter for their ends. As these articles must have shown, I am not an idolater of Constitutions; I do not believe that, once proclaimed, they should be carved forever on tablets of imperishable stone beyond the reach of impious hands. On the contrary, the people should be allowed to live with their Constitution. But the caprice of the powerful should not be confused with the anxieties, the longings, the want and the will of the people.

It may be that the reflections I have ventured to express in these articles may help to make our Constitution more responsive to the needs of the times. I shall be more than content if they are deemed worthy of consideration by a new Convention and by the people. Certainly, while we may disagree about means, we cannot quarrel about the desirability of a more responsible government, an electoral process as far removed from suspicion and distrust as it is possible to make it, increased protection for judicial independence, and a more immediate and direct enforcement of the popular mind and will.

The imperfect intellect of man, in its incessant search for the freedom, equality, and security which it has grown to deem indispensable to human happiness, is condemned to error and frustration, to illusion and disillusion, to the materialization of its worst fears and the defrauding of its best hopes. We try and discard, and try again what we have discarded. In folly or fury we wantonly destroy the wisdom treasured by generations and repudiate all the experience of civilization, and yet contrive to shape from the ashes and the ruins of our primitive wars, fresh new dreams and hopes to stimulate a race weary of its destiny. But we shall have nothing to fear so long as we keep alive within us this sense that growth is change, and that our power to fit ourselves to the world and history pledges our growth as a nation to that state of happiness under the hand of God that was the ideal sustaining and inspiring the makers of our Constitution.

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OUR ASIAN FOREIGN POLICY*

Mr. President, Members of the Board of Trustees,
the Dean of the College of Law,
Ladies and Gentlemen:

I am deeply honored by this generous investiture with a doctorate of civil law. I take it that this great university looks beyond my humble person in conferring upon me such an honor and desires above all to reaffirm its faith and the faith of all good citizens in the ancient excellence of a regime of law.

A more fortunate era, embodied in the illustrious jurist whose memory is preserved in the name of this institution, could regard the general acknowledgment among men and nations of the supremacy of law, as an implicit and fundamental postulate of civilized society. Cayetano S. Arellano was indeed only the archetype of his generation. He raised to the highest degree the practise of those principles and virtues which all his contemporaries recognized as desirable, and even necessary, for the peace and progress of the community. And throughout the civilized world, this great Filipino had his counterparts in other men of goodwill of every race, creed, and class, who believed in the primacy of law as the best source of liberty, equality, and order.

Unhappily that age has passed and the validity of those old assumptions is now being challenge in our modern world. I trust I will not be misunderstood as depreciating the great honor you have bestowed upon me if I venture to say that a doctorate of laws seems to be a purely ritual obeisance before a fallen idol, a hardy surviving anachronism in these times when the reign of law has been overturned so often and so violently by its ancient enemy in the guise of individual ambition, party interest, military necessity or ideological strategy.

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* Address delivered on the occasion of the conferment upon him of the degree of Doctor of Laws, *honoris causa*, by the Arellano University on April 9, 1949.

For this world in which we live is not indeed the world which the men of Arellano's generation envisioned when they prepared our people for the responsibilities of independence. In their world there was honorable room for a small free nation seeking its natural development under a regime of international law. In our world it seems that there is none and our young Republic finds itself, to our dismay, weak when strength seems to be the only safety, small in a world of expanding super-states, and neither so poor as to escape the cupidity of aggressors nor yet so rich as to be able to purchase the weapons of defense against aggression.

Perhaps the dramatic, more urgent, and more immediate crisis in our internal politics has obscured the equally grave and less easily resolved crisis in our foreign policy. But our tragic experience in the last war should have taught us that national independence is the supreme law of our people since there can be no assurance of individual liberties of representative democracy under a foreign tyrant, whose cruelty or corruption is beyond the sanction and punishment of the people.

It was truly an historical misfortune that we should have arrived at the culmination of our struggle for independence under the spell of our sufferings in the last war. I daresay it was almost impossible under those circumstances to shape a foreign policy fully in keeping with the dignity and interest of an independent nation. We were prostrate and divided, amid the debris of all our careful programs for economic development and economic independence. The horror of invasion and occupation, still fresh in our memories, combined with the sanguine hope for a new world to drive us into a course of international action that is now increasingly uncertain.

When the Republic was proclaimed three years ago, we placed our trust completely in the protection of the United States and the United Nations and, in all fairness, it must be acknowledged that it then appeared the most natural and enlightened policy. We had faith in the overwhelming power of the victorious democracies, united in a new international organization, to restore a regime of peace and order and to curb the predatory instincts of strong and unscrupulous states. We had faith above all in the might and generosity of America for it seemed our only salvation.

Because economic survival was so inextricably intermingled with political safety, our Republic found itself carried step by step into an intimate, and almost exclusive, association with the former metropolis. To secure the payment of the compensations, the pensions, the bonuses, the privileges, which had been so lavishly promised during the enemy occupation, we felt compelled to show that we continued to be loyal, or at least friendly, to our benefactors and therefore deserving of the fulfillment of those promises. To secure the continued enjoyment of the American market and those marvelous American assembly-lines, without whose preferences and advantages it seemed that we must perish, or at least suffer, we granted Americans the rights of citizens in our own country for the exploitation and enjoyment of the national patrimony. We sacrificed our sovereignty over strategic bases within our frontiers. We bound ourselves to buy the weapons for our defense only from this one friend, which had indeed proved the vastness of its resources as the arsenal of democracy in the greatest war the human race had ever fought. We were neither allies nor wards but our engagements left no doubt that we were ready to fight again with America, if not for America, in mutual defense. The world was thus presented with the admirable phenomenon of a new nation more dependent, and more willingly dependent, on its former sovereign after independence than before.

I have no quarrel with the basic premise of that foreign policy. I say without reservations that, in the world in which our generation lives, the best hope of our survival and our safety lies with the United States of America. The day of the small nation, of the small neutral nation, is over if it has ever begun. Only the modern super-state, embracing whole continents and oceans, commanding the varied techniques and skills of entire peoples, can lay claim now to the power to stand alone and defend itself. So that if America will undertake to stand by us with all the panoply of her weapons and resources, we can choose no wiser or more reliable policy than our present dependence on that maternal Republic.

But we cannot close our eyes to the events around us, which ever more insistently question the validity of our hopes and beliefs. I will not make reference to the words of individual Americans, to the indiscreet admissions of the American Secretary of the Army in Tokyo, to the veiled warnings of the chief of the United States Military Advisory Group in the Philippines, to the unheeded protests of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan. These are, after all, the opinions of individuals, subject to retraction, correction, and explanation. But events cannot be misquoted or denied, and the evidence before our eyes points to a decision in American foreign policy which we cannot ignore in determining our own.

The abandonment of China and the conclusion of the North Atlantic Pact emphasize the tendencies which were already apparent in the Marshall Plan. No official announcement is necessary to inform us that the United States has reverted to its policy during the war of placing Europe before Asia. I am not concerned, nor do I believe that our government should be concerned with the reasons for that policy. The bonds of race, of a common ancestry, of the same cultural values, are attractions that the Asians cannot hope to match in the rivalry for the primacy in American assistance. It is sufficient for us to recognize the fact.

I do not believe anyone will dispute it as a fact. The Marshall Plan, expanding the original conception of the British loan, has poured billions of American treasure into western Europe, while a mere trickle has been diverted into Asia. Nor can it be said that aid to China was withheld because the regime of Chiang Kai-shek was corrupt, incompetent and dictatorial, since the imperatives of strategic necessity have not allowed such considerations of honesty or democracy or even efficiency to diminish American military aid to Greece.

It is, however, the North Atlantic Pact which has placed American policy beyond misinterpretation or doubt. To fulfill American commitments under that treaty, Washington officials have openly admitted that American arms will have to be concentrated on western Europe for one full year. We are therefore faced abruptly with the explanation for the failure of the United States to meet our own military needs under the military assistance pact or to develop and increase the utilization of the bases granted by us under the corresponding treaty. It was the fond hope of the makers of our foreign policy that those bases would be the guarantee of American assistance against foreign aggression but the disturbing thought must have dawned upon us, that, instead of deterrents, they may yet prove to be the occasion and the justification for such aggression.

No nation can foresee the future and I am not inclined to blame the the makers of our foreign policy who, with the best of motives, miscalculated America's affection and sympathy for Asia. It is not strange that, with the betrayal of their expectations, they are now seeking to retrieve the situation by advocating a Pacific Pact, which would give the same American guarantees to the Asiatic-Pacific area that are now enjoyed by western Europe under the North Atlantic Pact. The alternative is isolation for this Republic, an isolation whose disadvantages we have ample reason to remember.

But I am compelled to express my skepticism of the proposal, a skepticism which, diplomatically disguised, can already be felt in Washington. For America, great as it is, possessed of unchallenged supremacy in scientific technique and industrial productivity, cannot save the world simultaneously in Europe and in Asia. We learned it during the long, long waiting for liberation; God grant we may not learn it a second time. And between Europe and Asia, America has already made an unmistakable choice.

It is now that we may well appraise the perspicuity of our foreign policy. In the naked and blinding light of America's choice for Europe and against Asia, we may well repent the errors which are now visited upon us, to confound us with irreconcilable contradictions. For it would seem now that we have drawn so close to America that we have placed Asia beyond our reach.

There was a time when like America, in the memorable words of Wendell Willkie, the Filipino people had a reservoir of goodwill in Asia. That was the time when our people, the most advanced politically among the races of this region, precocious in democracy, uncompromising in the common struggle for independence, provided a model and an inspiration for the masses of a submerged and subjugated continent. That was a time when the rapidly developing nationalisms of Burma, Indonesia, Indo-China, and even India, looked to the Filipinos, even more than we ever knew or realized, for leadership and sympathy. That was a time when the portraits of Filipino heroes and leaders were enshrined in the secret conclaves of the subject races of Asia.

But the same fatality of history that impelled us to submit to the diplomatic domination of America led us, for analogous reasons, to abdicate this moral leadership of Asia. Perhaps our people cannot be blamed for feeling a natural aversion and even indifference, to the cause of Asia for the Asiatics, so cynically perverted by the Japanese for their own ends. Yet it is certain that under the impulse of that curiously split personality of which, as the only Christian people in Asia, we are possessed, we wantonly wasted our reservoir of goodwill.

We were the first Republic in Asia and to the less fortunate peoples, who confidently awaited our encouragement and assistance, we gave neither help nor even common courtesy. It is hard to believe, and even harder to understand, that no one represented the Filipino people when India and Pakistan attained their independence when midnight struck for the British empire, or when Burma proclaimed its freedom at the hour set by its ancient astrologers. Significantly enough, our Republic was represented at the declaration of independence of the only nation in Asia that has chosen to remain uncompromisingly with the west, the Dominion of Ceylon.

To those other Asian peoples who might have expected our sympathy in their own struggle for independence, what have we given? Until recently we failed even to support the admission of the Republic of Indonesia to a place of equality in the councils of the Far East. And when that Republic was invaded and its leaders seized by sudden aggression, while the other free nations of Asia rallied quickly to impose sanctions upon the aggressor, the Filipino people withdrew into an equivocal aloofness from the controversy. Not a word of recognition, not one gesture of comradeship, has been extended to the revolutions of Indonesia and Viet-Nam. Instead we present to the world the extraordinary spectacle of the first Republic in Asia exchanging ministers and treaties with the principal colonial powers of the West and ignoring with timid indifference the revolutionary regimes that seek to assert the liberties and rights of Asia. It is a striking commentary on our foreign policy that we maintain or proposes to maintain legations in Britain, Italy, France, the Netherlands, and Spain, or receive their envoys among us, and yet neglect to establish even the most rudimentary relations on the lowest levels, with any Asian state outside of China. There is a Filipino minister to London, but none to New Delhi, Karachi, or Rangoon. There is a Filipino minister to Rome, but not even a consul in Hanoi, Bangkok, Singapore, or Jokjakarta.

It is against this background that the proposal for a Pacific Pact must be evaluated, a background of defrauded hopes, wasted opportunities, and even timid betrayal. For an association of nations for mutual defense and mutual assistance cannot be brought to life with a piece of paper. It must be founded on ancient friendships, on sincere attachments, on a real community of interests, and it must develop through common action in the common crisis. Such a foundation exists among the democracies of western Europe and it has developed logically and naturally through the military understandings of the Western Union and the economic arrangements of the organization for European economic coordination under the Marshall Plan.

If such a foundation is not to be found in Asia, our Republic should be the last complain and bewail. Obsessed with the American connection, scornful of our Asian heritage, we have dissipated whatever moral leadership we might once have exercised among the renascent nations of the east. It were presumptuous of us at this time to call for a unity that we have been the first to neglect. Nor can we expect America, already engrossed with the rescue of western Europe, to take the initiative in Asia when Asia can be truly and enduringly united only on the basis of independence and America is committed to alliance with precisely those colonial powers denying independence to the subject peoples of Asia. This irreconcilable contradiction must, by itself alone, spell the doom of a Pacific Pact that would embrace the masses of Asia. America cannot help the Netherlands in Europe and the Indonesians against the Netherlands in Asia, or France in Europe and the Viet-Namese against France in Asia. And no self-respecting Asian nation can be a party with Australia to a Pacific Pact of friendship and common defense in the face of the latter's exclusion policy against the Asiatics.

It is our peculiar tragedy that we have chosen to remain, hesitant and undecided, in the middle of this secular and continental conflict. Perhaps it is still not too late to salvage this sudden wreck of our foreign policy, to retrieve part of the goodwill we have dissipated with so prodigal a hand. It is still within the power of the makers of our foreign policy to look beyond the easy and specious schemes of a Pacific Pact to the only realities that can assure us the sympathy and assistance of Asia.

Without abandoning the American connection, which remains the best safeguard upon which, with varying certitude, we can rely, there is still time to repair the neglect and indifference we have heretofore displayed to our closest neighbors. A beginning has been made in the recent conference in New Delhi but embattled peoples hunting and hunted for their lives will not be long content with pious sentiments and ambiguous proposals. The time grows short and, if the great and generous protector upon whom we rested our trust must withdraw to urgent tasks, we must draw to ourselves by positive measures the friendship and faith of those kindred peoples with whom we must spend the time of waiting.

The international reign of law. under which a small and virtuous nation might hope to seek its peaceful development untroubled and unafraid, is yet to be restored. Humanity, prey to rival fears, cupidities, ambitions, hatreds, and sudden furies, it not yet disposed to submit its quarrels to conscience and to law. A nation such as ours, weak among the strong, small among the great, poor among the wealthy, peaceful and law-abiding in a world where both law and peace rest ultimately upon the strength of the strongest, cannot afford to indulge its prejudices and pamper its illusions. As we feel the protecting clasp of America relax and slip quietly beyond our grasp, our people may well be troubled with the realization that America is our only friend, and may well look about with apprehension and dismay at so many neighbors and potential friends, alienated by neglect and indifference or abandoned to the enemy.

God grant that we may know how to reconquer their trust and their affection, for we have need of friends indeed, and that we may learn to seek and find the enduring safety of the Republic not in the shifting favor of the great and powerful but in the steadfast comradeship of those kindred peoples with whom we are united by the common conquest of independence and by the common resolution to defend it against a new spoliation.

——oOo——

Today, no man in the Senate commands more respect by sheer force of mind than Recto. No one has a cultural background so broad, a logic so implacable, a rhetoric so firmly based on the matters.—Teodoro M. Locsin, *writer, newspaperman, and critic.*

An inspiring personality, one of the national leaders of our time, and certainly, the Great Thinker of this country for half a century.—Ernesto del Rosario, *writer and newspaperman.*

OUR MENDICANT FOREIGN POLICY*

Members of the Board of Regents,
Mr. President and Deans and
Members of the Faculties,
Members of the Graduating Classes,
Ladies and Gentlemen:

I have been told that because of the controversy that attended my selection as your speaker for this solemn occasion, there is general expectation of an address on the freedom of speech, or on the historic liberties and academic privileges of universities, those sanctuaries of learning which not even the king's constables could trespass.

But I do not have to speak to you on freedom. By your vigorous and uncompromising action in the very recent past, you have proved that you understand freedom, that you love freedom, and that you are ready to defend freedom even against those who have sworn upon the Constitution to make freedom a living reality.

Nor do I see any purpose in speaking of freedom for the benefit of those misguided elements, dissidents from our democratic ideals in the highest places and offices of the Republic. It were idle to recall the Constitution to those who read its provisions only in terms of power, and who understand power only in terms of vanity and self-advancement.

Indeed the problem of freedom for us today embraces more than the campus of one university or the personality of a single man. It is the problem of our survival as a nation. For the armistice of 1945 is already running out its course, even before the peace treaties have been written; and once again the war flags have been raised, and the multitudes are being excited to mutual fears, mutual hatreds, and loyalties to the death, while the tanks roll off the assembly lines, and mysterious weapons explode in desert-lands in a rehearsal of the final cataclysm. The armies, and the fleets, and the air armadas of the great powers are once again on the move, under banners identically inscribed with the ritual words of democracy and liberation, and small nations like ours must look for shelter amid the gathering storm.

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* Address delivered at the Commencement Exercises of the University of the Philippines held on April 17, 1951, at Diliman, Quezon City.

Tonight I recall a memorable event that took place in the old campus of this university ten years ago. Thousands of university and college cadets were marshalled by their instructors in an impressive military demonstration of loyalty to the sovereignty of the United States of America.

No one then could foretell the tragic end of the parade. There was no hint of disaster in the straw helmets and the clumsy 19th century rifles, no echo of doom in the steady rhythm of feet that would soon be dragging along the desolate road to Bataan and Capas. True it is that halfway across the world the mad genius of Germany was tearing up two continents and their seas and skies, while nearer home unbridled Japanese ambition was engrossed in its gigantic task of slaughtering or enslaving the Chinese people; but those vast explosions could scarcely be heard above the patriotic exhortations and the intoxicating martial music on the old campus. The facts of modern war had not yet prevailed against a field marshal's cheerful illusion that the cost in blood and treasure of invading and conquering the Philippines would be so enormous that no power on earth would undertake so hazardous and foolish an adventure.

Only one man on that campus suspected the truth that a fledgling air force without planes, a naval patrol with three mosquito boats, and ill-armed conscripts with three months of training in vegetable gardening, could not long resist the overwhelming impact of a first-class power. That man was the President of the Commonwealth, and contemporary history records, that, as he addressed the youthful ranks that day, Manuel Quezon had tears in his eyes because he foresaw the bitter destiny that awaited them.

His premonitions were confirmed when shortly thereafter we found ourselves engulfed in the disaster of Japanese aggression and American improvidence. Torn from his people and taken to an unwanted refuge in the tunnels of Corregidor, he watched with vexation and despair while the flamboyant plans of his field marshal collapsed in defeat and slaughter. When no aid came from America for the battered divisions of Filipinos on the front lines, except promises of redemption and a few well-chosen words of approval and encouragement, the bitter realization dawned upon Manuel Quezon that the Filipinos were not expendable in the interest of any nation and should not become involved and be sacrificed in the quarrels of great powers.

Ten years have passed since then. We have proclaimed the independence that we believed would be the best and surest means of guaranteeing our international safety. We have established a free Republic to control our relations with other states as our own interest, guided by justice, shall counsel.

It is in this control of foreign policy that we may find the decisive difference between the Commonwealth and the Republic, the one significant gain that we expected to make in moving from autonomy to independence. Freedom of speech, of the press, and of religion, self-rule, due process of law, social justice — all these rights we already enjoyed under the enlightened imperialism of the American people, and perhaps we enjoyed them to a greater degree during the Commonwealth than in these uncertain and ambiguous times of indefinite detentions, private armies, fiat and farcical elections, *de facto* governments, and open rebellion. What we sought and what we expected to gain with national independence was the right to give our own national interest, security, and welfare the primacy in our loyalties, services, and sacrifices. Now that 1951 takes the shape of 1941, and the clock turns back to strike alarms of another war, we may well ask ourselves what we have done with our independence in the last five years.

For unhappily, the times have not changed, and small nations must still pay the price of quarrels between great powers. Already we see before our eyes a reenactment of the tragedies of the last conflict, when, in Europe and in Asia, the small nations that became the battlegrounds of the great were compelled to endure the identical horrors of conquest and liberation. Now, in Korea, it has become evident that the techniques of war may have improved, but the ethics remain the same and the resulting desolation has only been compounded.

The unfortunate Koreans have so far undergone not one but two conquests and liberations. Four times the rival armies have crossed the famous parallel. Four times the capital of Seoul has suffered the process of competitive liberation. For those of us who experienced the liberation of Manila in 1945, where more lives were lost and more destruction resulted from the action of the liberation armies than at the hand of the maddened and desperate enemy, it is not difficult to believe that when Seoul was liberated for the fourth time last month, only one-fifth of the original population of one million and a half remained, and they were only the old, the children.

But the greatest casualties of the Koreans, we can be sure, have been not material but spiritual. Reduced to beggary, inflamed with hatred and the thirst for revenge, marked in one another's eyes, as with the mark of Cain, with the stigma of Soviet satellites and American puppets, the Koreans will not know peace in their own country for generations. How or when the prodigious conflict in Korea can be brought to some kind of conclusion cannot be foreseen, but one thing is certain, that when the rival armies strike their tents and go marching home, nothing will remain of the Korean people except a few ferocious survivors, hunting one another among the ghostly ruins of their native land.

Shall we become another Korea? What have we done with our independence to make sure that our country will not again become the battleground of foreign wars? What have we done with our independence to make sure that our people will not again be deserted in the interest of higher strategy and military necessity, and left to fondle the hard comfort of another "I shall return"?

To find the answer to these questions, which are the test of the validity of our independence, and of the worth of our foreign policy, we must begin by examining our present world position.

We are a small weak nation surrounded by the most populous races on earth, Christian among non-Christians, westernized in

Asia, conservative in the face of a continental revolution, clinging to a high standard of living amid perennially starving masses, and yet unable in an age of industrialization even to feed, clothe, and arm ourselves.

Weak in numbers, we have compounded our weakness with disunity. Poor in developed resources and therefore under the necessity of pooling our strength, we have plunged into a fratricidal struggle for whose prosecution the government must waste fully one one-third of its revenue, and which not only has rent national solidarity, but also has worked incalculable harm on the nation's economy. Still worse, each faction in the conflict has openly proclaimed its adherence to one or the other of the two great antagonists in another world war which they believe inevitable, so that if war comes it is a certainty that we shall become involved in the most cruel and sanguinary manner, for our own people are already set, brothers against brothers, with unforgiving hatreds.

Unable to defend ourselves against foreign aggression, we have not only weakened ourselves further with domestic strife but also given cause and provocation for attack. We have become war-mongers without armies, by making boastful challenges, threats and denunciations. And when our last remaining hope for peace and security lay in the continued concert of nations, and in the maintenance of international understanding, so that all peoples would have equal rights to justice and security under the joint guarantee of the great powers, we have helped to disunite the United Nations and even found satisfaction in its conversion into a forum for the propaganda of power politics.

But what is beyond comprehension is that, having fought three wars for our independence, we have surrendered it without a fight; and while vociferating about the reality of our national freedom, we have acted as if we did not want it or believe in it. We are tied to the dollar without having any dollars. We continue to be dependent upon the American market without having retained any permanent right of access to it. We continue to be equally dependent upon American protection without any real guarantee that it will be timely and adequately extended.

The tragedy of our foreign policy is that, being an Asian people ten thousand miles away from the effective center of American power, our behaviour has been that of a banana republic in the Caribbean. We have fed upon the fancy that we are somehow the favorite children of America, and that she, driven by some strange predilection for our people, will never forsake us nor sacrifice our interests to her own or to those of others for her own sake.

Yet, though we may feel the deepest admiration and respect for the American people, for their sense of fairness and their spirit of self-criticism, their love of liberty and justice, their patriotic pride, their deep and constant concern for their world destiny, and their thoroughness in the enforcement of their rights, still we should not believe, and I think it is wrong for us to believe and to act if we believed, that American policy can ever have any objective other than the security, welfare. and interest of the American people.

If we lived within the orbit of American strategic security in the western hemisphere, if the Philippines were situated, let us say, like Nicaragua, Alaska, Hawaii, or even Canada, we might safely believe that America would never abandon us, nor allow us to fall, even for a short while, into enemy hands, because she would be committed by her own vital strategic interest to defend us even beyond our own ability, readiness, or willingness to defend ourselves. Whether she loved us or not, whether she approved of us or not, whether or not we were corrupt and inefficient and otherwise ill-behaved, she would have to stand by us for her own sake as she would have to stand by Peron's Argentina or Trujillo's Dominican Republic in the event of a war in defiance of the Monroe doctrine.

Indeed, how many problems would be solved for all of us, how many anxieties allayed, how many perplexities avoided, if the Divine Geographer had only placed our archipelago in the gulf of Lower California or on the Atlantic seaboard of the United States! Then we might indulge with perfect safety our fondness for the American way of life, and beard the Soviet lion with trenchant phrases, or twist the tail of the Chinese dragon with provocative epigrams, in the assurance that we should never be called to account. Then we might sleep easily of nights in the warm embrace of American strategic necessity.

And for the culmination of desires, what keen joy and unalloyed pleasure some of our countrymen would feel if we were living, not in the era of Asian revolution and Soviet expansion, the atomic bomb and the annoying ECA requirements, but instead in the era of America's "manifest destiny" and dollar and Big Stick diplomacy! Those were the days when, to take an enviable example, the United States landed Marines in Nicaragua for the amazing purpose of compelling the reluctant Nicaraguans to accept a large American loan. Those were the days when an American Admiral, sent to Haiti to protect American lives and properties, could report to the American secretary of the navy that, "unless otherwise directed," he was ready to allow the Haitian Congress to elect a president acceptable to the United States.

Unfortunately, our preferences have been disappointed by so prosaic a thing as geography, and so indelicate a topic as race. The Creator, in His inscrutable wisdom, gave a brown pigment to our skins, and brought forth our people in the littoral of Asia. It is therefore illusion to believe that America has the same strategic obligations to a Caribbean republic as to a distant archipelago across the expanse of the Pacific, fairly exposed to enemy conquest; while to believe that America, or any other great power, for that matter, in the terrible crisis of war, will, under the imperative urge for self-preservation, ever sacrifice her own security and interest to idealism or to continental attachments, is to misunderstand the biological laws which determine the course of action of any great power in war or in peace, and to ignore the categorical imperatives of international behaviour.

The first and most fundamental of those principles and imperatives is that the objective of any foreign policy is national interest. This has been unquestionably true of England, whether ruled by Tories or Socialists, of Czarist Russia and Soviet Russia, of Bismarck's German Empire and Hitler's Third Reich, of the America of the first Roosevelt and the America of Harry Truman.

It may be argued that the interests of all free peoples must be the same. That is a convenient but deceptive generalization. To take only one example, the United States and the United Kingdom are the main partners in the North Atlantic Alliance, yet England considered it to her national interest to recognize the Soviet government of China, while America considers it to her national interest to withhold such recognition.

Are the Philippines and the United States to be regarded as an exception to this general rule of international relations? The unhappy experiences of our recent past, the conflicting requirements of the primitive law of self-preservation, and the elementary obligations of national independence, would suggest a negative answer; and we need not go beyond the latest events to find confirmation.

The unanimous sentiment of our people is that the Japanese must be made to pay for their crimes in the Philippines, and must be deprived of the means to repeat those crimes. But the proposed Japanese peace treaty, drafted by the personal representative of the American President, Ambassador John Foster Dulles, leaves no doubt that the American interest requires precisely the opposite. We have been asked, in veiled terms, to permit Japanese rearmament, and to recognize that Japan "lacks the capacity" to "make adequate reparations" for "war damages." We have been reprimanded for our unseemly insistence upon those reparations, and reminded that they would ultimately have to be paid by an already over-burdened American taxpayer. We have secured a token concession in the form of a vague promise that the issue is not closed, and still subject to an exchange of views, but the draft treaty carries the clear warning that, if we do not sign within nine months after ratification by Japan, then America will enforce the treaty by herself, and leave us to whistle for our credits.

Surely no more conclusive evidence of diversity of interests can be found; surely no stronger proof can be adduced of the principle that the American interest is and must be the primordial objective of American policy. It may not be to the Philippine interest to allow the restoration of Japanese hegemony in Asia, but it is to the American interest, as openly affirmed by

John Foster Dulles, to rebuild Japan as America's principal ally against Communism in this part of the world.

Yet our foreign policy was conducted from the very beginning, and is being pursued, on the erroneous assumption of an identity of American and Filipino interests, or more correctly, of the desirability, and even the necessity, of subordinating our interests to those of America. Thus, on the fourth of July 1946 it was announced that our foreign policy would be to follow in the wake of America. We have, indeed, followed. We followed America out of Spain and back again; we followed America in her aimless pilgrimage in the Holy Land, from Jew to Arab and Arab to Jew, as the American need for Arab oil and the administration's desire for Jewish votes dictated; we recognized the independence of Indonesia when America did, and not one moment before. In the world parliament of the United Nations, it is no more difficult to predict that the Philippines will vote with the American Union, than that the Ukraine will vote with the Soviet Union. American policy has found no more eloquent spokesman and zealous advocate, and Russian policy no louder critic and more resourceful opponent, than the Philippines. Americans may disagree violently with their own foreign policy, but it has no better supporters than the Filipinos.

We have followed America even in our domestic affairs. We have followed every change rung by the Bell Act and the Bell report. We are following JUSMAG as we followed PHILRYCOM and AFWESPAC. Nowadays any American Ambassador to the Philippines may be given, without incongruence, the concurrent title of Governor-General, High Commissioner or Proconsul, to whom the President of this Republic himself must go humbly to apologize in person for an offensive press release. For its part, we have seen our Congress, since the fourth Monday of January, engrossed in the singular task of enacting into law the recommendations of an American economic survey mission. Organized pressure has been brought to bear with ill-concealed impatience to stampede the passage of the desired legislation, and when the Senate, seizing the opportunity to extort from a reluctant administration those electoral reforms which general opinion had vehemently demanded to save Philippine democracy, withheld approval of the recommended measures until the

the infamous system of block-voting had been abolished, it was censured and condemned even by the so-called independent press.

We are told by the historian Toynbee that the Greek Stoic philosopher Cleanthes prayed the gods for grace to obey their commands of his own will and without flinching, for even if he should quail and rebel, he would have to follow just the same. This, it appears, is the same prayer that our latter-day Greeks in the administration, not bearing but expecting gifts, must raise daily to Capitol Hill.

Whom are we to blame for this curious process of legislation through foreign control, this unprecedented surrender of the most cherished privileges of an independent state? Certainly we cannot and we should not blame the United States. It is not their fault if we have failed to understand the rights, and are incapable of discharging the duties, of independence. It is not their fault if we find ourselves on the verge of financial collapse, and depend on American aid for survival. It is not their fault if we have not learned the virtues of self-help and self-reliance, and must be bullied even to enact a minimum wage law for the benefit of our own workers.

When we are so dishonest, inept, and prodigal, that we cannot run a government on the resources of the potentially richest and most democratically schooled people in Asia, and must beg constantly for subsidies, then the United States have the right to see to it that the dollars they lend are not dissipated in extravagance, purloined by malefactors in high office, or misspent on fraudulent elections, and that, in return for their assistance, they shall have the final say on our foreign policy and receive the services of our diplomats as their spokesmen and press relations officers.

We may complain that the United States have driven a hard bargain; that we have no security of any continued assistance; that, even if we should now receive the first instalment of fifteen million dollars out of the total of two hundred and fifty million recommended by the Bell Mission, the American Congress may still refuse to appropriate the additional fifty million dollars proposed for 1952, and the remaining instalments, even after we shall have fulfilled all conditions, and even if we should be able, with our billion-peso debt, to match the ECA assistance dollar for dollar, as the plan requires.

We may argue that the United States have lavished upon Japan, their former sworn enemy and present obsequious ward, at least two billion dollars as unconditionally as the terms of her surrender; that India, who has refused to follow America's lead in the United Nations and has persisted in a course of neutrality, was voted by the American Senate an enormous grant of desperately needed grain, also unconditionally; and that Spain, who retains a regime which America has heretofore considered unfriendly and distasteful, and even Yugoslavia, who actually has a Communist dictatorship, can both expect large subsidies, just as unconditionally, or at least without the surrender of any of the essential attributes of a truly independent state.

But Communist Yugoslavia is said to have the best army in eastern Europe outside the Iron Curtain, and her Titoist rebellion against the Kremlin must be encouraged and maintained; Spain has the only effective standing army in western Europe and a religious hatred of Communism, and she must not be allowed to drift into another civil war due to economic distresses; India, with her vast population, leads the new nations of Asia upon a course of compromise with Communism, and she must be courted and won; and Japan has been marked for the role of America's most valuable ally against Communism in Asia, and must therefore be restored to industrial health, military vigor, and international prestige.

But what have we to offer on our part? What has America to lose if she offends an administration that cannot survive without her support? What has America to gain by accommodating an administration that, because of its inherent impotence, is already irrevocably committed to her side?

A bankrupt administration must necessarily have a foreign policy of mendicancy; and it is inevitable that it should invite foreign intervention to do what it cannot do for itself. When a government cannot count on the united support of its own people, then it must unavoidably have recourse to the support of a foreign power; and because beggars cannot be choosers, we can be safely ignored, taken for granted, dictated to, and made to wait at the door, hat in hand, to go in only when invited.

Unamuno tells the anecdote of a proud beggar who, having been upbraided for presenting himself on a day which was not the one assigned for alms-giving in the household, felt wounded in his beggar's pride and, returning the copper coin given by his benefactor, told him in an arrogant gesture, to go look for another beggar upon whom to practise charity which would qualify him for the kingdom of heaven. But this mendicant administration cannot even take this chance; for America might really look for another beggar.

Where has this policy led us? What have been the consequences of bartering our independence for relief from our domestic distresses? When we come to examine our present predicament in the world of 1951, and as much of our future as it is humanly possible to foresee, we are confronted with a prospect that might well give pause to a nation stronger and more self-reliant then we have allowed ourselves to become.

We find that one-half of the world does not recognize the reality of our independence or the legitimacy of this Republic, upon which indeed they look with undisguised scorn and an open purpose of attack, and it is precisely this half of the world upon which we border, separated by a single sea from a government whose aggressive designs have already become manifest in Korea.

In this exposed position, we are completely isolated, for the other peoples of Asia have charted a policy of conciliation and settlement diametrically opposite to ours, and the only neighbors upon whom we can conceivably call for assistance are the marooned dictatorship in Taiwan, the racially prejudiced commonwealths of Australia and New Zealand, and our recent conqueror Japan.

Our only possible lifeline is obviously the traditional American connection, drawn across the vast expanse of the Pacific, and made more tenuous still by lack of confidence. Dependent entirely upon American arms for self-defense, we find it increasingly difficult to secure them. Having rested our hopes upon American bases, we find them unmanned, dismantled, and in the

Ambeth Ocampo

great majority abandoned, so that rather than source of protection they may become targets for attack. We have been encouraged to oppose and fight the expansion of Communism in Asia, and we have done as we have been told, but in return we have received only vague and uncertain promises of assistance, and the confirmation of a policy that would surrender Asia rather than imperil Europe.

If war should come, therefore, we would be doomed to another and a worse Bataan. Once again, as Manuel Quezon feared and lived to see from the tunnels of Corregidor, ill-feed, ill-armed, and ill-trained Filipinos, discriminated against by their friends and outmatched by their enemies, would take on their flesh and bone the first shock of aggression by overwhelming power. Once again our people would have to endure the horrors of war, compounded beyond human experience by weapons of mass extermination and wholesale destruction, and the agony of enemy occupation, stretched beyond human endurance by the perfected techniques of tyranny; and, for added tragedy, would find themselves divided into irreconcilable factions, one clearly committed to the United States, and the other allegedly aligned with Soviet Union, in the most cruel of all wars, a fratricidal war.

And while, as a result of that war, a Communist victory will mean that we would be ruled by Chinese commissars from Peking, giving orders to Filipino Communists, and under their domination the floodgates of our country would be opened to an alien race incomparably more numerous, enterprising and energetic, the alternative, in the event of a Communist defeat, would seem to be no less appalling and detrimental to our national interests.

For it is now evident that the grand design of American strategy is to make Japan the leader of the anti-Communist forces in Asia, because her people are said to be the only people in this region with the military traditions, the technical skills, the numbers, the discipline, and the industrial resources necessary for the huge and exacting enterprise of modern war. But are we to believe that warlike Japan, having fought her way back to predominance in Asia, will have such tender regard for the interests of the Filipinos that she will long follow what the proposed Japanese treaty calls "fair trade practices," or continue to accord to us "most favored nation treatment," or even respect our "territorial integrity or political independence"? Do the Americans themselves imagine that a victorious Japan, having won America's battles in Asia, and having been restored to her former position as a first-class power, will not seize the opportunity of finally bringing to realization her dreams of Asian domination?

We would be presented, therefore, with an invidious choice between either Mao Tse-tung as Moscow's foreman and warden in Asia, or Hirohito as the new supreme commander for the Allied powers in the Pacific, the latter-day SCAP of a revived Japanese Co-Prosperity Sphere. Our future, if we escape extermination, would seem to be that of either a Communist Chinese province, or an imperial Japanese prefecture!

I may be asked if we could have a different foreign policy than that which will probably lead us to such a disastrous alternative. If I did not think so, I would cease to believe in the validity of our independence. If our foreign policy could not be any different, then all our nationalists of the past half century, from Mabini to Quezon, were guilty of a gross mistake, and our people, who raised them to power by near-unanimity, were equally guilty of an historical injustice against those repudiated Filipino Federalists who thought that the Philippines would be better off if she became a state in the American Union.

But as long as we are an independent Republic, we can and should act as a free people and as Filipinos. As Filipinos we must profess and declare that the security of our nation is paramount, and as a free people we must profess and declare that, while the liberties of other peoples are important to us in this world of interdependence, our first duty is to our own.

We should not subscribe, therefore, to the heretical thesis of the titular head of this Republic that our independence, instead of being an inalienable right which came to us from the Supreme Lawgiver, was America's gift, and that consequently we should be ready to lose it for her. America herself would be the first to repudiate such a slavish concept of freedom. Indeed, it would do greater honor to America's idealism, redound to her glory, and attest to the success of her enlightened experiment in nation building, that we should have a government that understands and is capable of exercising the powers and of discharging the responsibilities of independence, both in domestic and in foreign affairs; a government that, because its legitimacy is not in question, will deserve and receive the united loyalty of the people, and will not therefore be compelled to trade sovereignty for survival; a government which will know how to live within its revenues and to spend the people's money judiciously, and will not therefore fall victim to economic necessity which is the mother of intervention; an independent government, in fine, which will be in a position to help with efficacy the cause of world freedom without jeopardizing the vital interests of its own people.

The first objective of such a government must be peace, for, as a small and weak nation, it is to our prime interest to explore with patience and sincerity every avenue of honorable and enduring settlement by negotiation and mutual concessions. If war must come, it must not be of our own making, either directly or indirectly.

But if war becomes inevitable because the good judgment of peoples has been overriden by the madness of their rulers, then, whether it is viewed as a contest for world supremacy, as a trial at arms of two rival concepts of democracy, as a war to make the world safe for democracy for the third time, or as another war to end war, there can be only two possible antagonists, the American Union and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its satellites. As between these two, our own idea of freedom, an enlightened estimate of our permanent security, our traditional relations, and our standing treaties and agreements would impel us to the side of the American people.

Such a war, however, fought with vast armies and demoniac weapons, could only be prosecuted by the continental and oceanic mass-powers of Eurasia and America, and no Asian nation, or group of Asian nations, could be reasonably expected to carry for America the brunt of the conflict, as Communist China and North Korea appear to be taking it now for Soviet Russia, least of all a nation like ours which cannot even cope with, and has to spend one third of its total revenue to suppress, internal disorders. No nation such as ours can be, in simple fairness, called upon to provoke and expose itself to an attack which it could not survive.

We understand that even the vast resources of America are not unlimited, and that, in the priorities that must be assigned between Europe and Asia, every appeal of racial instinct, every atavistic impulse, every consideration of a common heritage of culture, and even the requirements of domestic politics, would draw the American people to the homelands of their ancestors. If that is so, and it is so, then America should also understand that Asia cannot be more solicitous than America herself for her own interests.

And yet, the logic of accomplished facts should turn the American people, however reluctantly, to Asia, for it is in Asia that Soviet expansion has taken the initiative and has already taken the toll of a million casualties; it is in Asia that more American lives have already been lost than in any comparable period in American history, and the bulk of America's available divisions committed beyond recall; it is in Asia where both the American President and the former Supreme Commander of the United Nations forces, despite their personal differences, have agreed that aggression must be stopped, and where the Communists themselves have repeatedly declared that they must open the way for the conquest of Europe. But to the astonishment and dismay of Asia, America has only recently reaffirmed her continuing loyalty to the policy of Europe first. It is upon Europe that America lavishes the billions of the Marshall Plan, while Asia must wait and bargain for grudging and sporadic concessions, and watch with despair and impatience the slow uncertain workings of the Point Four program. America has known how to understand the anxieties and apprehensions of small European nations, and has taken the initiative, with the firm pledges and guarantees of the North Atlantic Alliance, to soothe the fears, placate the natural pride and encourage the spirit of collective security of the western world, from Oslo to Lisbon. America has given her word to her kinsmen in the Atlantic Community that any attack upon them will immediately bring into action the full strength of her expanding military machine.

What comparable assurances and guarantees have been given to Asia? Where is a Marshall Plan for Asia? Where are the pledges of an automatic declaration of war, the organization of united forces on land, at sea, and in the air, and the consultations among equal allies, as in the North Atlantic Pact? Asia has none, either for reasons of strategic concentration, racial complexes, or because of western indifference and distrust, and as if to emphasize the inferior status of Asia, the American President has now relieved from all his commands in the Far East, the military chieftain, who, for all the indiscretions and blunders with which he has been charged, is the embodiment of the policy of Asia before Europe. If Douglas MacArthur had been reprimanded or even recalled for openly disobeying superior orders and for arrogating to himself powers and prerogatives which were not his due, it would have been entirely a matter of internal American concern, but when he was shorn of his commands and deposed from office upon the undisguised demand of America's European allies, and mainly to allay their fears that America would become so committed in Asia that she might leave Europe to her own resources, it became cause for alarm and demoralization throughout all Asia.

It is not strange therefore that the Asian nations, with one notable exception, have looked with aloofness, suspicion and discouragement upon the ambiguous maneuvers of their former colonial masters. Only the Philippines, oblivious of guarantees, reckless of consequences, driven by the financial appetites of an incompetent and subservient administration, under the spell of strange delusions about geography, race, culture, and the imperatives of international relations, rushes in where stronger and wiser neighbors fear to tread, forgetting that pygmies cannot afford to make enemies of giants whom they may be left to face alone. Only one Latin American republic has participated in the Korean campaign, out of the nineteen that lie sheltered within the orbit of American protection in the Western hemisphere; even the Japanese, the chosen leaders of America's crusade against Communism in Asia, are now protesting against the grant of American bases and the unequivocal espousal of America's cause, but we have elected to disregard all the dictates of prudence and national security, and, for all the warnings that are written large and plain upon the wall, for all that the American Congress has passed a stern resolution requiring that it be consulted before American troops are sent abroad, that the political situation in the United States is so unstable and unpredictable that the policies upon which we rely to-day may be repudiated tomorrow, and that the American administration has openly reaffirmed its preference for Europe and its racial kinsmen in the Atlantic Community, we continue parroting the slogans and mimicking the gestures of American policy.

But no reasonable, no patriotic, no self-respecting Filipino can be content with promises to return, or relish a situation where we place ourselves in the vanguard of an atomic war, without arms, without retreat, without cover or support, destined to be annihilated at the first encounter, and therefore rendered unfit for a belated liberation. If America really believes that war is inevitable, then let her give us in Asia a resolute leadership we can trust; let her give us the same unconditional pledge and guarantees and the same actual evidence of a spirit of equality and common fate that she has given to her kinsmen and allies in the Atlantic Community; and we shall have justification for the risk of war, and incentive to make common cause.

Otherwise, we must restrain our enthusiasm, dissemble our sympathies, moderate our words and actions, and in fulfillment of the primitive duty of self-preservation, make no enemies where we can make no friends, and hold our peace. It may be a precarious peace, of uncertain duration, at the mercy of military time-tables and power-politics, but if it is broken, at least it shall not be said that we sought it, and if we are attacked, that we deserved it. Meanwhile we must, whether in the Sierra Madre and the Candaba swamps, or in Aviles and Arlegui, whether within or beyond the pale of present authority, forswear allegiance to any foreign power, and cease to fight the battles of one or the other of the super-states beyond our borders. Whatever our economic theories, social grievances, and political beliefs and affiliations, and whatever the future has in store, we must stand united, under a lawful and legitimate leadership, as citizens of one country, one flag, and one Constitution, so that if war comes, it will not find our nation rent asunder in a paroxysm of self-annihilation.

Let not Macaulay's traveller from New Zealand exploring the spectral ruins of Manila in the course of his post-atomic war peregrinations, and cautiously testing the radioactive waters of the Pasig, from the broken arches of the Quezon bridge, have cause to ponder that in those shattered tenements and poisoned fields and rivers once lived a nation unique in the annals of mankind, free men who put their liberties on the auction block, a sacrificial race with a mysterious urge to suicide, who, being weak and weaponless took upon themselves the quarrels of the strong, and having been warned of their abandonment still persisted in their lonely course, and whose brutalized and monstrously deformed survivors, scrambling with stunted limbs in the infected debris of their liberated cities, had forgotten even the echo of the memory of the strange illusion for which their race had fought and perished.

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SUPREME COURT CITATION

October 27, 1936

Dear Justice Recto:

As your association with us on the Court draws to a close, we can not but express our sincere feeling of loss and warm affection for you.

You came on this Court famed as a man of letters, as a jurist and as a parliamentarian. Your vast, profound learning and your keen penetrating power of analysis, which permeate the decisions which you have penned, are a by-word to many. You are leaving with a lasting impression of the jurist who has tirelessly and scrupulously sifted the truth from a maze of judicial record with an eye always to administering justice to the litigants and to lightening the burden of your colleagues.

In the hope that it may serve as an imperishable token of our sincere affection and admiration we ask you to accept this modest plaque which we now present to you.

Sincerely yours,

RAMON AVANCEÑA, Chief Justice; CARLOS A. IMPERIAL, ANTONIO VILLAREAL, ANACLETO DIAZ, JOSE A. SANTOS, JOSE P. LAUREL, Associate Justices.

ECONOMIC NATIONALISM*

Mr. Chairman,
Ladies and gentlemen:

I have been asked to speak before this select gathering of members and guests of the Manila Rotary Club on the subject of Economic Nationalism. The subject was well-chosen because few can be found that are as full of interest and as important. But, broad as it is, it cannot be treated adequately in one single conference, for which reason I shall confine myself to examining some of its more important aspects.

What is "nationalism"? Among the various definitions given by Webster I consider the following as the most appropriate: "Devotion to, or advocacy of, national interests or national unity and independence; patriotism."

A distinguished Filipino editorial writer, Jose Luna Castro, has recently defined "Nationalism" in terms of Philippine history, saying: "Nationalism x x x was the driving force that propelled Bonifacio and his men in the revolution; it was the underlying sentiment in the works of Rizal." One of the outstanding young statesmen of our day, Senator Lorenzo Sumulong, the worthy son of that other great Filipino statesman of yesterday, Don Juan Sumulong, spoke of "nationalism" in terms of geography in a recent article, as follows:

> x x x the intense nationalistic spirit of Filipinos today is just a part of that mighty wave of nationalism that has been sweeping throughout Asia since the opening of the 20th century with ever-increasing force especially after the end of World War II. It is as futile and fatuous to deny reality of Philippine nationalism today as it is to deny the historical fact that since the conclusion of the last world war there has been a reactivation of nationalistic movements through-

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* Address delivered before the Manila Rotary Club on March 28, 1957.

> out Asia, more dynamic and more irresistible than ever before, like a wildfire spreading in all directions without letup and with unabated fury. As was well epitomized by a historian, if the 19th century may be called the age of nationalism in Europe the 20th century should be called the age of nationalism in Asia.

And when that great American statesman William H. Taft, one time Civil Governor of the Philippines, then President of the United States, and later Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, admonished his countrymen in the early days of the American occupation, that the "Philippines" is " for the Filipinos" and those who did not believe so could pack bag and baggage and leave the country, he put in a nutshell America's true and correct concept of Filipino nationalism and laid the corner-stone of an enduring Filipino-American friendship and association.

If, according to Webster, "nationalism" and "patriotism" are synonymous, then, to be a patriot is to be a nationalist, and vice versa.

It is for this reason that I do not believe in qualifying "nationalism" with such restrictive adjectives as "positive" and "balanced." To dilute nationalism thus would be like emasculating "patriotism."

Assuming that we are agreed on the concept of nationalism which, as applied to the Philippines, and in the light of Webster's definition, is devotion to, and advocacy of Filipino interests and Filipino unity and independence, zealous adherence to our own Filipino nation and its principles, in brief, Filipino patriotism, let us examine what are the present realities and those that characterize our "special relationship" — so it is called — with the United States.

Ours is still the underdeveloped country that it has been for centuries. And while our population has increased our economy has lagged behind. Mass poverty and mass unemployment have been the logical and inevitable results. It cannot be doubted that if things continue drifting the way they have been we will soon fall prey to communism, for the decisive battle against this enemy shall be fought in the social and economic field, and won only by giving all the people economic security and comfort, and not through lip-service to democracy and tongue-lashing against the communists, or through injudicious amendments of our time-tested codes and statutes that will place our freedoms and liberties at the mercy of the power-mad and the unscrupulous. Only a bold competent leadership can produce the break-through that will set us moving away from this extremely perilous situation.

This requires economic planning which should be the government's special concern, because it has been our sad experience that private Filipino entrepreneurs, without government initiative and intervention in the form of incentives or aid, have not been able to offer opportunities for increased production, employment and decent livelihood for all the people.

Our economy is heavily dominated by non-nationals. They have, *per capita*, more income than our own people, which is understandable since capital, which here is to a large extent foreign, begets profits, and profits increase capital that begets further profits, while salaries and wages which, in general terms, constitute the share of the people in a colonial economy, are never high enough to allow their recipients much beyond their needs for daily sustenance, and almost nothing for savings. If, therefore, we mean to develop an ecomony that will bring welfare and economic security to our people, the pattern must be changed. Now, planning presupposes a policy to which planning must be adapted. Do we have this policy?

An economic policy must respond to basic economic problems, those arising from the economic realities in the nation; for instance, the kind of economy that the nation must have and the proper approach to the related questions of foreign investments and financing.

Have we settled these basic problems? During the 1955 session of Congress an attempt was made to have Congress declare as a national policy the maintaining here of an agricultural economy by means of an administration bill sent to Congress with a provision to that effect, contained in its Section 2. The bill was favorably reported by the corresponding committee, but the Senate, timely alerted, frustrated the insidious attempt by eliminating the objectionable policy declaration. But despite this, Executive officials continued regarding rural development not merely as a laudable government pursuit but as the very economic policy of the nation. Only a year ago it was authoritatively announced that "the rural development program of this Administration is in itself the blueprint for national socio-economic prosperity." On the other hand the National Economic Council announced almost at the same time — this was about the first quarter of 1956 — that industrialization was the basic economic policy for the Philippines, the very one for whose adoption I have been battling for the last four years. But, shortly thereafter, as if in reply to said announcement, the local head of the ICA, who is supposed to be the Republic's top Economic Adviser, in his speech before the Sugar Technologists Convention made the following pronouncement with an air of dogmatic finality: "Agriculture will always be the major prop of Philippine economy, and as rural existence prospers, so will industrial, business and social activities. This is planning on a long range basis, and we know it is going to pay off in benefits to the Filipino people."

But after three years of economic confusion the nation has at last pledged itself to the policy of "reshaping our economic structure with the industrial side accounting for a rising proportion of our total output in the years ahead." This was stated for the first time in the President's State-of-the-Nation Address of last January which contains this added declaration: "We must foster an economy in which industrial expansion and agricultural progress are complementary."

Now that it can be said that industrialization is at last a national economic policy, it is pertinent to inquire whether there is a definite plan for the implementation of such policy. It is officially admitted, with not a little reluctance, that there is yet none.

We were told in the State-of-the-Nation Address that there was an "economic plan adopted at the start of this administration on March 20, 1954," but because "the plan was not inflexible," it had "to be updated periodically on the basis of x x x changing conditions and prospects of further advance," and, for this purpose, a so-called Government Reorganization Plan No. 10 was created in July 1955, but in view of "the end of free trade with the United States in 1955 and the forthcoming Japanese reparations," it was finally decided to entrust the National Economic Council with the task of revising the 1954 Economic Plan. Further difficulties, according to the Address, continued besetting the revision of the 1954 plan, in the form, it was said, of "trends in the Council not in harmony with the Chief Executive's fiscal policies," with the result that, to do away with such "trends," a change had to be made in the composition of the Council in March 1956. And it was only on January 3, this year, that "the National Economic Council submitted its recommendations for updating the 1954 economic development program," but these recommendations were not accepted *in toto*, but only that part referring to what in the Address is referred to as "industrial priority system." Congress, however, has never been advised of said plans.

Mr. Conrado Ramirez, formerly acting director of the Council's office of national planning, upon resigning from this position last January said, that "all previous economic programs including that of 1954 were drafted under 'external stimuli,' " that "none of these past plans was formally adopted and none was conscientiously implemented," and that "there has been no conscious, long-term coordination of economic action to assure the necessary amount of cooperative effort towards overall economic development." Mr. Ramirez singled out as the greatest obstacle to economic development our colonial mentality, arguing that we "depend too much on foreign advice even on matters requiring our independent action."

But although the government has not been able to make any definite planning for our economy, it has at least adopted a policy, which I hope will be permanent this time, and that is none other than industrialization.

If it would not be presumptuous on my part I should say that I was in some measure responsible for the adoption of this new national economic policy. In the last three years I have been trying to show in a series of public addresses why the Philippines must industrialize, by citing America's own experience in developing her economy from the agricultural or rural to the industrial stage. For the benefit of those who still believe that to insure our prosperity we must remain producers of raw material for the use of industrial countries, and consumers of finished products manufactured by the same countries, I beg to state anew my position in this regard with the aid of unimpeachable historical facts and statistical data.

In 1820 the ratio of America's working force engaged in agriculture to her total working force was 71.8%. Which means that, as the case is with the Philippines today, her major activity in 1820 was agricultural. In the decades that followed there was a gradual reduction of the percentage: in 1830 — 70.5%; in 1840 — 68.6%; in 1850 — 63.7%; in 1860 — 58.9%; in 1870 — 53%; in 1880 — 49.4%; in 1890 — 42.6%, 1900 — 37.5%; in 1910 — 31%; in 1920 — 27%; in 1930 — 21.4%; in 1940 — 17.6%; in 1950 — 11.9%. Today the ratio is about 5%. These figures show that from 1820 to 1870 America was predominantly an agricultural nation, but that she became less and less so as she changed the quality, pattern or structure of her economy in the last quarter of the last century, until she attained her present position as the most highly industrialized nation and consequently the wealthiest and most prosperous in the world.

These figures indicate not only that there has been a continuous reduction in the ratio of the agricultural labor force to the total working force but also that there is a necessary correlation between prosperity or higher production and reduction of the working force engaged in agricultural activities.

Looking at it from a slightly different angle, we shall find that in 1910 the farmer population in the U.S. was 34.7% of the total population and the agricultural income was 16% of its total national income. Since 1910 the percentages of the farm population and of the agricultural income fell continuously every decade, so that in 1952 the farm population was only 13.4% of the total population and the farm income only 6% of the total national income. According to the latest figures the farm income in the United States, as of 1955, was only 3.9% of the total national income, and this despite the existence of agricultural surplus. From these facts it is clear that, as the share of its farm income in the national income has decreased, the U.S. economy has prospered and progressed, and that in any given year or number of years the proportion of agricultural effort to the total economic effort has been always larger than the proportion of the agricultural product to the total product. It is for this reason that economists describe agricultural occupations as occupations of low marginal productivity. Conversely, the share of manufacturing industries in the total product is always bigger than the corresponding share of manufacturing effort (working force) in the total economic effort. Thus the economists describe manufacturing occupations as occupations of high marginal productivity.

The UN figures make the case airtight for industrialization. The relative value of output per worker in agriculture and in manufacturing was recently studied for seventeen nations, and it was found that with the value of output per worker in agriculture as basis for comparison set at 100, the value of output per worker in manufacturing is always above 100, ranging generally from 200 to 400 or even 500. In the United States it is 227; in Poland, 335; in Norway, 402; in Greece, 577. Said the report: "The value of output per worker is generally higher in industry than in agriculture and this difference is specially large in underdeveloped countries. In industrialized countries, mechanization and modern practices in agriculture are important factors tending to raise the value of agricultural output per worker to levels approximating those attained in manufacturing and mining." Statistics show that farm workers have the lowest income, with the only exception of those in the domestic service. Thus, with the exception of servants, the agricultural workers anywhere are the workers that produce the lowest value.

In the light of the above statistics no Filipino economist could be so stubbornly skeptical as not to believe that industrialization is the key to economic progress and that an industrial economy like that of the United States or Britain should be our goal.

We should feel gratified that there are now strong elements in the United States that favor the industrialization of the underdeveloped countries. For business reasons the heavy industry people advocate industrialization because it will mean greater need and demand for machinery and equipment and machine tools, which they produce. In other sectors the same opinion has been expressed but on different grounds. Labor leader Reuther, for instance, in a speech at New Delhi on April 5, 1956 suggested that the American people, through its government, commit 2% of their gross national product every year for a period of twenty-five years to help the economically less developed nations to help themselves in developing their own resources. The contribution according to him, would be made to a World Fund for Peace, Prosperity and Progress, with no strings attached. Then the Soviet Union and other nations would be invited to do the same, that is, contribute to the Fund. Although Reuther did not specifically mention industrialization, he must have had that in mind considering that India, whose people he was addressing, was feverishly working for industrialization just as other underdeveloped nations, if given the freedom, would wish to do.

The most articulate statement of the case for a new foreign economic policy for the U.S. was made by a noted economist and management consultant, Peter F. Drucker. He said about a year ago: "The rapid industrialization of these [underdeveloped] countries is the best investment the U.S. can make in its own economic future. It is, moreover, the foremost ambition of those countries themselves. And it is a job which the U.S. — both because we were ourselves a 'raw material producing country' only a few short decades ago and because we are the leading industrial society today — should be preeminently fitted to make our very own." (*Harper's*, April 1956).

But despite all these recent favorable indications of a possible change in the American atmosphere, it would not be realistic for us to fold our arms and expect that all will be well. Economic and biological laws operate *ex necessitate rei* with complete disregard of sentimental values. We must remember that America's need for the raw material of the underdeveloped countries and outside markets for manufactured goods and investments is increasing at a tremendous pace. If the underdeveloped countries were to industrialize they would be using their own primary materials thus lessening the supply to the

United States and other industrial nations which at present take up all that supply. The underdeveloped countries would, besides, find it convenient if not altogether necessary to start manufacturing goods which they at present import from manufacturing countries because it is with respect to those goods that there is a proven market at home, with the result that home manufactured products would crowd out the imported products depriving the exporting countries of their markets.

A Canadian economist from the United Nations who served for a short time as adviser to our National Economic Council, called the attention of our people to the evident lack of dynamism in our economy and emphasized the strong need to bring rapid changes in its structure. He said that we need a bold and and ambitious program of industrialization without which the rate and pattern of our economic growth would never succeed in outrunning population growth and in bringing prosperity to the people. He warned that unless the rate of job creation is raised, open unemployment (which does not include disguised unemployment) could, by the end of five years, approach 1/3 of our labor force.

In the face of these realities the official though belated announcement that our national economic policy should be industrialization, is most welcome. It took the first three years for the government to realize that to peg our economy to its present agricultural structure is to peg the nation to poverty.

From the experience of all industrial countries we have learned that economic progress requires the shifting of the major part of the people from the soil to industrial pursuits. Rural development program must go on, but we must always bear in mind that, as has been the case with other countries, increase in agricultural productivity and in agricultural production can never hope to keep up with the growth of our population. People in the rural areas should for their own benefit gradually turn to industry, for it is there that they will find deliverance from an occupation which, according to the UN Report I have already cited, for the greatest efforts gives the least returns to the worker, outside of domestic servants. It is disheartening to note that because of false propaganda this is not yet fully understood amongst our people, due to the fact that our leaders have been allowing themselves to be misled for a long time. It is only fair that they know the truth, and it is for this reason that I decided to expose the defects of an agricultural economy and the evils of a program designed to tie us down to such an economy.

Russia today, with all her undemocratic and godless ideology that we detest, is the second industrial power in the world. Communist China's amazing progress in this field is nowhere decried. It must be on the basis of these facts that Toynbee predicted that before the end of this century the major powers of the world would be China, the Soviet Union, the United States, India, Germany and Japan, in that order. Why have Russia and China progressed so fantastically in their economic development? Certainly not because of their resources because they had those resources during their long period of economic backwardness. Neither is it because of communism, since non-communist countries like Britain, the United States, Germany and Japan had progressed just as fast. It must be industrialization, their common denominator.

We must, of course, begin with industries which will use primarily raw materials produced here, and will gradually fill the needs of our own local market, but heavy industry — base metals, power and fuel, machine tools, machinery and chemicals —should not be ignored. For obvious reasons, heavy industry is the basis of any industrialization, for it is heavy industry that insures greater potentialities for continued increase in the production of consumer goods.

I said in this connection, about two years ago, that there were two sectors in heavy industry in which we could enter once we firmly decided to industrialize. I was referring to hydro-electric power and iron and steel industry. With respect to iron and steel, there was no justification, I said, for our timidity to venture into this field. We have enough iron, and we can make steel out of it. We export 1-1/2 million tons of iron ore to Japan, and can increase it to 2 or 3 million tons. But we could use this iron ore ourselves. We get seventeen to nineteen pesos per ton from our iron exports, and then we import steel to 400 pesos per ton. We have not only the needed iron ore; there is an abundance of manganese, chrome, limestone, and coal which are vital raw materials in the manufacture of steel. The manager of the NASSCO attests to this fact. He says that the argument that we have no available coking coal is just a bugaboo because we can use "coke briquettes" from a blend of low grade and high grade coals, or use charcoal, or hydro-electric power.

It was, therefore, with understandable satisfaction that I read the following statement in the State-of-the-Nation Address:

> To lay the basis for the development of a metallurgical industry, the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO) is now establishing the first pig-iron smelting plants in the country. These plants will process iron ore coming from our own mines into pig-iron which, in turn, will be used by existing steel mills. NASSCO will also establish rolling mills for steel plates and sheets which will be used in shipyards and other fabricating shops.

For our industrialization foreign capital is needed. But by foreign capital I mean loans in the form of capital goods coming from foreign sources, not capital as investments owned by foreign investors.

Time and again I have voiced my opposition to *further* foreign direct investments here. It is with deliberate emphasis that I use the word "further," because I want my position clearly understood. Existing foreign investments here constitute vested rights which are as much entitled to protection under our Constitution and statutes as those of Filipino nationals. And when I say protection for these alien investments I mean protection not only from direct assaults to impair them or discriminate against them, but from uncertain and vacillating policies and decisions: uncertainty is the worst enemy of business. But in the interest of both groups, particularly of Filipino nationals, and for the sake of the nation itself, I propose that it is alien investments in the form of loans that should be by all means encouraged. And my stand is based both on political and and economic grounds. As a writer in the *N.Y. Times Weekly Review* (Aug. 5, 1956) has well pointed out, foreign investment "is closely linked with political power," and "the long range effects of the influx of capital (capital owned by foreign investors) is to charge the political as well as the economic and social conditions in the capital-receiving countries. The term 'colonialism' is a loose one. It apparently is intended to apply to the relics of imperial power, above all, of Britain and France. But it would be a mistake to apply the term only in a political sense. . . Economic independence may be far more important than political independence. Hence the fear in some countries that foreign capital may undermine their independence."

The best examples of direct foreign investments are those of Puerto Rico and Venezuela. In every one of them the geographical product, as should be expected, far exceeds the national income. The appearance of national prosperity based on *per capita* of geographical product is, therefore, misleading. In Puerto Rico as well as in Venezuela the country, in geographical terms, is rich, but the people are poor.

The experience of Canada is worth examining. I take the following from the *U.S. News & World Report.* Long term investments in Canada, mostly in mining, smelting and oil, from overseas amounted to $13 billions of which $11 billions came from the United States. Much of Canada's iron ore, nickel, aluminum, oil and copper is directly or indirectly under the control of American investors. "This fact has proved quite galling to some Canadians." (*U.S. News & World Report,* March 30, 1956). The Canadians were disturbed to discover that of the sixty biggest corporations in their country, less than 1/2 are Canadian controlled. (*N.Y. Times Weekly Review,* June 3, 1956.) Despite the fact that the inflow of U.S. capital to Canada has slowed down since 1953, U.S. interests now actually control about 1/2 of Canada's manufacturing, about 1/2 of the paper and pulp industry and more than 1/2 of her mining and smelting. The Canadians have been in an uproar. They speak of "domination," "economic slavery," "economic colonialism," "alien stranglehold," and political leaders are calling on Canadians "to declare their economic independence from the U.S." (*U.S. News & World Report,* May 4, 1956.)

If we should only ponder on the experience of Puerto Rico and Venezuela not to mention that of Canada and others, we would cease clamoring for more foreign direct investments here.

They are economically disadvantageous to the countries that receive them because whatever profits, dividends and interests on direct investments are realized flow out of the country. Since much of this outward flow investment income is generally from investments in mines and minerals, the final result is that besides losing this income to the foreign investor, the underdeveloped country loses its irreplaceable minerals. And what does it get in return? According to economist Das Gupta ("The Theory and Reality of Economic Development" — *C. B. News Digest*, Jan. 24, 1956), the only gain to the country is "some employment and some tax revenue." Clearly, that is national suicide by slow degrees.

Recently two distinguished Americans gave the same warning to the Filipinos. One of them, who was here three months ago, Mr. John I. Snyder, Jr., President of the "U.S. Industries Incorporated" said that: "The Filipinos should guard their patrimony zealously and institute executive and legislative safeguards or controls against greedy foreigners who want to acquire wealth quickly." The other, James M. Langley, former Chairman of the American panel that negotiated with his Filipino counterpart the revision of the Bell Trade Agreement resulting in the Laurel-Langley Agreement, recently warned that "it would be disastrous to local trade and commerce if too much foreign investments were permitted to engage in industrial and commercial enterprises here."

Secretary Dulles reported to the American people in March 1956 after the Karachi Conference that Asian nations in general would accept aid only if it were given without political strings. I believe it will not be long now when America herself will adopt the policy of granting loans as a form of investment. Wolf & Sofrin, authors of *Capital Formation and Foreign Investment in Under-Developed Areas*, (1955), already suggested that the U.S. government subsidize the government banks to enable the latter to lend to foreign nations at 2% interest. The banks are to receive 5% to 6%, the difference to be covered by the subsidy proposed. If this subsidy from the American government cannot be had, then an interest of 3% to 4% would perhaps be reasonable.

If the attitude of the American government on important policy matters such as the one under consideration is reflected in that of a competent cabinet member, then it may be surmised that the suggestion advanced by Wolf & Sofrin and long advocated by me is looked upon with favor by the present Republican Administration. Very recently, Secretary Humphrey of the Treasury, in a letter to President Eisenhower's Advisory Committee on Foreign Aid, outlined his plan by proposing that "all future economic aid would be in the form of repayable loans handled by the State Department." Our government and economic and financial organizations should lose no time making the necessary follow-up of Secretary Humphrey's proposal for its immediate adoption and implementation.

Although it must be admitted that there is need for dollars for the importation of capital goods from abroad, it should not be overlooked that in any industrialization we have to depend mostly on internal financing. The reason is obvious. For payment of wages, which constitutes the bulk of the cost of production, and of raw materials locally produced, we use our currency. We only need dollars or yens or pounds for foreign purchases. I am afraid we have become unduly dollar-conscious as if our economy depended under all circumstances on the dollar. That is, I believe, a mischievous error, obviously inspired and fostered by those who will benefit from our continued dependence on the dollar. It is, therefore, necessary to emphasize the fact that in any economic development the chief instrument of the entrepreneur is the local currency — the peso, in our country — and not the dollar.

In our historical archives there is no declaration of independence except that of Kawit. But that independence was buried in half a century of foreign domination. When we regained our independence in July 1946, we did not make a declaration for the purpose; we were satisfied with a Proclamation issued by the American President, and it was the American concept, not ours, of Philippine independence that was placed in the document: a grant, not an assertion of rights. We became officially independent in the community of nations, but are we truly independent, for instance, in the realm of foreign relations, national defense, finance and economics? Shall we blame on others our own shortcomings and complacency?

But we must not despair. A true national awakening shall doubtless come. The ranks of nationalists cannot but increase; the collective conscience continues to grow; the day of realization nears, because the moving finger continues to write. And someday this nation will realize, and will shape in deeds, Mabini's puissant and uncompromising exhortation which that immortal architect of the First Philippine Republic made just before the turn of the century: "Strive for the independence of thy country because thou alone hast real interest in its greatness and exaltation, since its independence means thy own freedom, its greatness thy own perfection, its exaltation thy own glory and immortality."

These are not my words, but they are my faith, if I may say with Churchill.

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*Whether writer, or jurist or statesman, wherever he has attained distinction, one cannot but feel that here is a man whose personal destiny seems to be closely linked with the destiny of the nation. As a matter of fact, the two paths, the path followed by the man and the path followed by the nation, have already crossed on various occasions. ***His many-sided personality and far ranging mind provided the newspapers with their headlines and the young student with his inspiration; and the impact of his intellect on the questions of the day are often sufficient to crystallize public opinion or determine the direction of political winds.* — Vicente J. Francisco, *ex-Senator and President, Francisco Law School.*

THE PROBLEM OF OUR NATIONAL PHYSICAL SURVIVAL*

Mr. President, Lady and
Gentlemen of the Senate:

Since the beginning of this Fourth Congress of the Republic I have held my peace, not participating in any debate nor delivering a single privilege speech. I have confined myself to listening to the proceedings as an interested observer and an attentive listener to your eloquent orations and brilliant repartees, not the least of which were the tirades in Latin with quotations from papal encyclicals by the lay champion of religious nationalism in this chamber, the distinguished and able Senator from Zamboanga del Sur. Even when a favorite subject of mine — foreign investments via-á-vis nationalism — came up for discussion I refrained from taking the floor for a minor interpellation; fortunately the defense of my stand on that matter, which has been the motivating influence in my forty years of public service in all three departments of our government, has fallen in capable hands. Nationalism is one great fact in our national life in this age of missiles, economic imperialism, and outer-space incursions.

Men in public life, particularly those who, like us, are situated at the most salient points of the political front, may keep temporarily silent in the face of problems which concern the nation most deeply; problems like poverty, misgovernment, puppetry, or threats of external aggression; but when the problem of national physical survival is involved, the survival of the Filipino race, it is their duty, paramount, imperative, clear and present, to speak their minds because silence would be an act of betrayal. Pope Pius XII in his last Christmas message said that "existence," meaning physical existence or physical survival of the people, is a condition to the very adoption of the Christian way of life. And as the great contemporary philosopher and mathematician, Dr. Bertrand Russell, a Nobel Prize winner in Literature for 1950, said in the famous letter he addressed recently to both President Eisenhower and Premier Khruschev: "The supreme concern of men of all ways of thought at the present time must be to ensure the continued existence of the human race."

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* Speech delivered on the floor of the Senate, Wednesday, May 21, 1958.

The problem of problems: our national physical survival

The problem I will discuss before you is even graver, a thousand times graver than the problem of our national security against foreign invasion, occupation and conquest. This problem, which should be foremost in our mind, is our physical survival as a people and as a race, whether we shall continue to exist or disappear completely from the face of the earth. Slaves may still hope for emancipation; but dead men's only hope for resurrection is on the Second Coming of the Redeemer.

This problem of our people's physical survival recently acquired frightening proportions when a plan was seemingly agreed upon between representatives of the Philippines and the United States to establish within the national territory launching sites for ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads.

The plan to establish missile sites in the Philippines — a clever maneuver

A *United Press* dispatch, dated April 17, Manila, made reference to a statement supposedly made by President Garcia in the course of an interview with a representative of that press agency, in the following tenor:

> If missiles are needed for the defense of this area I think some agreement can be worked out. The wrath of the Communists is to be expected. The Philippines is firmly allied with the free world.

Five days later, an *Associated Press* dispatch, dated Washington April 22, reproduced the Garcia statement.

The reaction, if reaction it was, of Washington officials to the Garcia statement was the shrewdest that could be imagined.

It was revealed by the same *Associated Press* dispatch in which the following commentary to the Garcia statement appeared that "Garcia may have been preparing the groundwork for some future *requirement*, defense sources said," because "the United States has not asked for missile bases," and "United States officials consider it premature to discuss the establishment of nuclear weapons bases in the Philippines." The dispatch concluded with the suggestion, probably originating from the same source, that "the subject may well be considered when Garcia visits Washington in mid-June." According to another *Associated Press* dispatch of May 9, Assistant Secretary of State Robinson disclaimed knowledge of any plan on the part of the American Government to negotiate for nuclear bases in the Philippines or other countries of the Far East.

Considering the patriotically perfect teamwork among official Washington, the American Embassy in Manila, and the American press correspondents in Manila, it would seem that the Garcia statement of April 17, approving in principle the establishment of missile sites in the Philippines, was deliberately provoked by the *United Press* correspondent in order to give official Washington the opportunity to say, perhaps not in so many words, that if we want missiles, we can have them, but America really does not care one way or the other. The *Daily Mirror* (May 7, 1957) commented perspicaciously in an editorial: "Whereas other chiefs of friendly states had balked at the idea when it was broached to them, here was one who seemed to be taking the initiative, probably egged on by a well-placed question from the interviewer. The statements from Washington ranged in tone from the coy to the flabbergasted." The suggestion from Washington that the President could take up the subject in his forthcoming visit there, because "Garcia may have been thinking ahead, preparing the groundwork for some future *requirement*" is very meaningful. What future requirement did the defense officials in Washington have in mind? Did they imply that in exchange for a 300 million-dollar loan, President Garcia would allow, on his sole responsibility, the establishment of sites for storage and launching of American ballistic missiles in Philippine territory?

In the midst of a nation-wide recession and unemployment, the worst that has ever hit the United States, and a congressional election campaign, and of the preoccupations brought about by the explosive situation in the Middle East, the "crisis of confidence" in Latin America, the forthcoming summit conference among the Big powers, and the life-and-death rocket competition with Soviet Russia, when official Washington invites the head of a small allied nation who had annouced his purpose of borrowing money in going there, we have before us a very serious matter to ponder upon. It looks ominous to me. I am afraid we have been maneuvered into a situation where it will appear that launching sites for ballistic missiles would be set up here because we wanted them and bargained for them, and not because they were forced upon us by the United States.

But the cat had been let out of the bag before Assistant Secretary of State Robinson could deny knowledge of the plan. Even before President Garcia had given his April 17 statement Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles, on April 8, was reported to have said that "the United States *would probably seek bases* for ballistic missiles in the Far East." And almost a month later, this statement was followed by one from a high-ranking officer of the U.S. Army, the new Jusmag Chief, Major General William H. Nutter, who, in his first press conference at Jusmag headquarters, made the following statement: "Missiles are part of modern warfare . . . *I am aware of the feelers made about the possibility of putting up missile bases here*, and the United States is waiting for the official stand of local officials on the subject. There are many places in the country which would make strategic missile bases in defense of this area." (*Manila Times*, May 8, 1958.)

Our distinguished Senate President was more cautious in his approach. He said, when interviewed on the subject, that "before the proposal to establish missile bases in the Philippines is discussed, the jurisdiction issue in the military bases controversy should be settled first." The *Daily Mirror* commented editorially: "Senator Rodríguez is apparently one among many Filipinos who have been disturbed by the apparent drift toward missile bases in the Philippines without adequate understanding of their military and political implications. Senate President Rodríguez made a welcome statement regarding the proposal." Senator Sumulong, the distinguished chairman of the foreign

Relations Committee of the Senate, and the distinguished gentleman from Manila, Senator Tolentino, said in radio interviews that no step should be taken in this matter without previous consultation with Congress.

My own evaluation of the events is, as I have stated, that the United States had a well considered plan on these overseas missile bases and that a situation was engineered in which it would appear that we in the Philippines proposed to establish launching sites here and that the United States was magnanimous enough to accommodate us. The United States has the number one diplomat in its foreign service as Ambassador to the Philippines. He must have been chosen to map out American strategy, political and military, for the entire Far East. A diplomat of his stature would not have been sent to this area were it not because the situation here is considered critical from the point of view of America's interest. It is to be hoped, for the sake of our national interest, that our Foreign Affairs and National Defense Departments are a match for the American Embassy. But, do not recent happenings here suggest that the Ambassador has been too much for the framers of our foreign policy and the strategists of our national defense? The American diplomat has proved shrewd, subtle and calculating, and his final stroke is firm and decisive. Have we been once more outwitted in the diplomatic game?

The "coup de grace" by an able diplomat. — We are again at the losing end of the bargain

As was to be expected the *coup de grace* came soon. It came in the form of an agreement solemnly signed on our part by our Secretary of Foreign Affairs — with all the ceremony to which Filipino officials are so addicted — which provided for the creation of a so-called Mutual Defense Board, a consultative body on the implementation of existing military arrangements between the Philippines and the United States. A joint statement on behalf of the two governments was issued upon the signing of the agreement hailing it as a "major step in securing effective collaboration in the joint effort to improve and enhance the common defense." The newly created defense board is to be composed of top-ranking representatives of the Philippine and American armed forces. A Filipino and an American will be co-chairmen of the board as befits *equals*. Its purpose is "to provide continuing intergovernmental machinery for direct liaison and consultation between appropriate Philippine and United States authorities on military matters of mutual concern so as to develop and improve, through continuing military cooperation, the common defense of the two *sovereign* countries." Have we bartered once more substance for high-sounding words and found ourselves again at the losing end of the bargain?

I must remind my listeners that the Military Bases Agreement has existed since 1947, and the P.I.-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty since 1951, and yet with so many American Ambassadors that have rotated here, among whom was an Admiral who distinguished himself in the last war, none of them ever thought of this marvelous device of a "mutual defense board" for the implementation of said defense treaties. The present Ambassador had to come and the question of sites for missiles had to arise for our experts to conceive this brilliant idea. It took the American Ambassador little time to study the Filipino psychology and even less to size up the Filipino official. On our colonial mentality Rizal wrote: "*Tres siglos de esclavitud forman en el alma una joroba que no ha de enderezar el trabajo de un día.*"

Upon the signing of this agreement a morning daily, considered to be the unofficial organ of the American community in the Philippines, published this information which up to now has not been questioned nor contradicted: "Officials explained to the *Bulletin* that the establishment of 1) missile sites, 2) a network of 'standby' or dispersal fields, 3) subsidiary bases, and 4) a joint air defense system, were among the 'military matters of mutual concern' which would come within the ken of the new defense board."

Have our executive and military officials decided the matter of establishing missile sites in the Philippines on their own without consulting Congress? Did it not occur to them that, in making such commitment, as they appear to have made, they signed away the lives of our people, without previously asking them if they were willing to commit race suicide, which is what stockpiling missiles and establishing launching sites in this country would mean?

America's European partners want no missile sites — They are magnets for annihilating nuclear attacks

In fairness to President Garcia I do not wish to question his patriotism, nor his sincere concern for the welfare of our people. I prefer to believe that his April 17 statement favoring in principle the establishment of missile launching sites in the Philippines was simply the result of inadequate information or deliberate misinformation regarding the true stand of America's NATO allies in Europe on this same subject of missile sites. He therefore must have made the statement procured from him by an American correspondent in the belief that it reflected the stand of European partners. In fact General Nutter, the Jusmag Chief, was reported to have said in his first press conference that "missiles had been sent to Europe and other parts of the world." If this was the same information given to President Garcia, he must have understood that "Europe" meant each and every one of the NATO European countries. If that was also what General Nutter meant, his statement was misleading and contrary to facts. The truth is that only Britain agreed to receive missiles and to establish her own bases for launching them. But even in the case of Britain public opinion in that country seems to have repudiated the agreement because, according to a Gallup Poll held thereafter, to the question of----

> "Do you think the Americans should be allowed to set up bases in England for rocket missiles carrying atomic bombs?"

the following answers were obtained:

Yes, 31 per cent; No, 55 per cent; undecided, 14 per cent.

Needless to say, the British Labor opposition bitterly assailed the agreement. Be it remembered that Britain is the number one ally of the United States in the free world.

The peoples of Europe who are more alert to the realities of the situation are opposed to such missile bases in their respective territories. Chancellor Adenauer of West Germany, at one time the most devoted ally of the United States among the heads of state in Europe, surprised Secretary Dulles with his recent interest in opening new negotiations with the Soviet leaders and his statement that he did not want to be cast in the role of the "last warrior of the cold war or as the Syngman Rhee of Europe." (*U.S. News & World Report*, Jan. 3, 1958.) The London *Times* said in an editorial shortly before the NATO conference began last December in Paris, that "the perennial twin anxiety of the European Nato countries" is "that America will hesitate to defend them now that she must be assumed to be vulnerable to nuclear attack herself, or alternately that she will set off the nuclear deterrent *and ruin them in the process of defending them.*"

To make myself brief on this point, I will give Your Honors the evaluation made by the *U.S. News & World Report*, a magazine which may be considered an unofficial organ of the American National Defense Department, of the result of the conference on the missile subject among the NATO powers held in Paris during the Third week of last December, which President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles personally attended. The evaluation was a weak attempt to cover up the failure of the missile conference. I quote in reverse order the pertinent paragraphs, from that magazine's issue of December 27, 1957:

> Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, Greece and Portugal, all are reluctant to accept the U.S. plan.
>
> The Netherlands accepted in principle, but, as a small, densely populated country, wants the sites dispersed in other countries to spread the risk.
>
> West Germany, while approving of the idea of nuclear-missile bases in Europe, doesn't want them in Germany. The Germans argue that they are too close to the Soviet Union to protect such sites from a swift land attack.
>
> Norway, Denmark and Iceland want no nuclear weapons on their territory.
>
> Turkey, the only country which accepted the U.S. proposal at Paris just as the U.S. offered it, is asking that national commanders be authorized in advance to use atomic

> weapons stockpiled in their territory in an emergency. But the U.S. does not want to give other powers the right to touch off atomic war—Allies or no.
>
> France, whose territory is the most desirable site on which to base medium-range missiles, is out to regain her standing as a world power by breaking the U.S.-British monopoly of Western nuclear weapons with an atomic bomb of her own. And the French have not yet accepted the U.S. proposals which leave nuclear warheads in U.S. custody.
>
> Britain has already agreed to build missile-launching bases, pay for them and accept U.S. missiles and nuclear warheads for four British-manned bases.

What is the reason for these reactions of the NATO powers to the American proposal of stockpiling missiles at bases in Europe, reactions ranging from ill-dissembled reluctance to outright refusal? Is it because NATO is disintegrating? Is it because of the psychological effect of Russia's admitted technological temporary superiority? Is it because Russia is winning the cold war through her shrewd propaganda? It is not for any of these reasons. Is it because overseas stockpiles of ballistic missiles are *magnets for enemy attacks*, and in case of a nuclear war, where it is reasonable to expect that the Communists will strike the first blow, any country of the free world with a stockpile of missiles would be the first to receive that blow and would, as a result, be totally destroyed: plants, animals and men. It is for this reason that I am submitting to Your Honors the proposition that the stationing of ballistic missiles in Philippine territory, as it appears to have been planned behind our backs, poses for us the problem of problems: national physical survival, because in the event of war, nuclear attacks on our missile bases, and it is to be expected that they will be launched simultaneously on Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao, would bring about the physical destruction and annihilation of our country, our people and our race. There could be no such things. and they would be meaningless for us in any case, as massive retaliation, liberation, ultimate victory of the United States. because in a global nuclear conflict we in the Philippines would all be dead within the first hour that it shall have started. Let me elaborate.

The new age of H-bombs and ballistic missiles

Modern science and technology have evolved the hydrogen bomb and the ballistic missile. The first has increased the explosive and destructive power of one single bomb, from a few tons of TNT in the last war to several million tons (megatons). The scientists have assured us that the United States and the Soviet Union together have in their possession today enough of these hydrogen bombs to burn the atmosphere, destroy all oxygen, and cause death to every living thing on earth: plants, animals, and men. Admiral Brown, head of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, was no more optimistic. If the United States and Soviet Russia were to fight a nuclear war just between themselves, he said, the peoples of the North Temperate zone would be totally annihilated. The clear inference is that if the next nuclear war would be total or global, and such would be the case because allies and satellites would be engulfed by it, the whole of mankind shall be annihilated.

The situation for the world was not so frightful when only the atom bomb existed and there were no missiles, and the bombs had to be carried to enemy targets by manned bombers. Since then science and technology have taken a few big strides and developed the hydrogen bomb and the missiles or rockets, about which I spoke and warned our people nineteen months ago, that is, in October 1956. These missiles can carry the megaton hydrogen bombs as warheads more easily and with greater speed than the manned bombers. The missiles are so fast that, with all the new radar network established by the United States, the warning time to permit the use of nuclear bomb shelters in the United States or to take defensive measures has been reduced to only two minutes from the moment of launching, because it would take no more than 35 minutes for an ICBM launched from Russia to hit its target in any part of the United States, and of course, vice versa. As for an IRBM, one launched from the nearest enemy coast would only take five to seven minutes to hit a designated target in any part of the Philippines, which would give hardly any warning time at all. Missiles travel faster than sound. That is the reason, as recently explained by the U.S.

Federal Civil Defense Administration, why the United States has finally decided to abandon plans for building nuclear bomb shelters. (*INS*, May 8, 1959.) Allen Dulles, brother of Secretary Dulles, and head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the highest U.S. intelligence office, in a secret testimony before the U.S. Senate Preparedness Subcommittee, said that the U.S. air bases abroad are now within reach of the Russian "operational and on site" IRBM's and that the Russian "operational missile system would reduce to a couple of minutes the all important alert time required to get these bombers [U.S.] off their bases after a Soviet missile attack." (*AP*, Dec. 1, 1957.)

In view of the present development of the H-bomb and the ballistic missile, what is the picture of mankind's problem of survival?

The problem of national survival in the U.S. --- What American military experts and scientists say

Let us first consider the case of the United States. I wish to remind Your Honors that for the last many months, the highest concern in the United States according to the statements of its own highest leaders, both in the Executive and Legislative Departments, has been national survival. Several top level studies have been made, and reports submitted on this question. The Senate Preparedness Subcommittee, headed by Senator Lyndon Johnson, conducted secret hearings which began last December, precisely on this overall important issue.

Permit me to quote the portion of the testimony given by General Gavin, Chief of Army Research and Development, on December 13, 1957 before the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee, which was declassified and released for publication. Senator Johnson, chairman of the subcommittee, was propounding the questions.

Q. (Senator Johnson) -- "What is our national-survival picture vis-a-vis Russia? Are we behind? What is your opinion?"

A. (General Gavin) -- "From the straight estimate of balance of military power, our position is extremely difficult, I would say, at the moment."

Q. -- "You think we are behind?"

A. -- "Yes, I would say we are."

Q. -- "General, I noticed you measured your words. Do you think we are behind Russia in military capability at the moment?"

A. -- "In the broad spectrum, and considering how it could be applied, I would say: Yes, we are."

The following day, December 14, 1957, Dr. von Braun, the German scientist, director of development for the Army Ballistic Agency of Huntsville, Ala., and known as the "Father" of U.S. Explorer I, testified before the same Senate Preparedness Subcommittee, as follows:

Senator Johnson: "Did I understand you to say that, with the carrier sending up Sputnik No. 2 weighing 1,200 pounds, the Russian could send a hydrogen warhead 4,000 to 5,000 miles?"

Dr. von Braun: "Yes, sir."

Q. -- "You have no doubt about that?"

A. -- "No. This is pretty straightforward. When you can orbit, shall be say, a thousand pounds, then you can throw approximately 3,000 pounds over an intercontinental distance."

Q. -- "If they chose to and they had the hydrogen warhead, the same carrier that put the dog up there can put a hydrogen bomb over Washington, D.C.?"

A. -- "It is a question of whether it would hit. This I do not know. On the other hand, I think we should not underestimate their capability in the guidance system." (*U.S. News & World Report*, Dec. 27, 1957.)

Major General Pokrovski of the Red Army is reported to have said that "the Soviets can come within six miles of a designated target."

Dr. von Braun also testified that the Russians can jam all radar warnings by using harmless Sputnik decoys.

Senator Johnson himself, leader of the majority in the Senate and prospective Democrat presidential candidate in 1960, said at a Democratic caucus on January 7, 1958: "The testimony of the scientists is this: control of space means control of the world, far more certainly, far more totally than any control that has ever or could ever be achieved by weapons or by troops of occupation . . . . The Soviet ability to put satellites of this size (1/2-ton) in orbit indicates a rocket ability far beyond any capacity we have developed." He concluded: "The capacity to launch a 1/2-ton satellite is interpreted by our scientists as evidence of the capacity to launch an ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] against our cities." Senator Johnson's statement was evidently based on the testimony of Dr. von Braun as already reproduced.

I wish to remind Your Honors that the foregoing statements of General Gavin, head of the U.S. Army Research and Development, of Dr. von Braun, the Father of Explorer I, and of Senator Johnson, majority leader of the Democrats in the Senate, were made in December 1957 and January 1958, at a time when they all accepted the Soviet announcement that Sputnik II weighed only 1,120 lbs. or little more than half a ton. As late as March 15, 1958, Dr. von Braun was still basing his calculations and conclusions on the Soviet claims regarding the weight of Sputnik II. He said then: "Our Explorer is a rival [of Sputnik] in spirit only," after comparing the 30 lbs. payload in Explorer I with the 1,120 lbs. payload in Sputnik II. He said further that with their rocket for Sputnik II, the Russians could shoot a payload of 300 to 400 lbs. to the moon. He concluded that the Soviet Union is "definitely ahead" of the United States in ballistic missiles and satellites. She is ahead of the United States according to him, at least five years in these fields. He disregarded the second U.S. satellite, Vanguard I, in his comparison because it weighed only 3-1/4 lbs. (*AP*, March 15, 1958.)

The statements of Dr. von Braun must be updated in view of latest developments. The twenty scientists, headed by Dr. Hynek, composing an official committee created to study the satellites in orbit, after making a calculation of their own regarding the real weight of the Sputniks, said in their official report that the real weight of Sputnik II was not 1,120 lbs. or about half a ton, as claimed by the Soviets, but was between four to six tons. (*INS*, March 16, 1958.) Undoubtedly, Dr. von Braun must now realize that the gap between the two super-powers in the missile and rocket fields development is much wider than he thought. And had Dr. von Braun made his calculations and conclusions, not in March but now, after the Russians had put in orbit their Sputnik III, whose weight is only a little less than 3,000 pounds, his pessimism would sound more despairing, On the other hand, Dr. Edward Teller, father of the American H-bomb, is more realistic. He said that the Soviets had developed the ICBM which now can pinpoint any target in the free world. Russia, he said, is "dangerously ahead of the United States in space weapons." He concluded that it may take ten years for the United States to overtake Russia's scientific lead. (*UP*, Nov. 25, 1957.)

The ORO and the Gaither Reports on America's problem on national survival

We shall see what top level secret reports say on this problem of national survival in the United States.

The ORO Report, also called the Johnson Report, was made by the Operations Research Office. It was Johnson, Director of ORO, who wrote the Report. Among other things, the Report said that today Russia has enough planes to make a successful raid in the United States and knock out most of the U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases. Its conclusions say in part: "Our detection system is inadequate . . . Our interceptors are not adequate . . . Our defenses are not adequate . . . Russian attacks will be intended to terminate our will to resist by simultaneously destroying enough of our population and economy to kill our will to resist . . . The present situation is favorable to them. . . Time is working against us and in their favor as trends go . . . The (U.S.) overseas bases [and this includes naturally bases in the Philippines] are very vulnerable, and if I were doing the Soviet attack, since I would have many more short range aircraft, I would clobber all the U.S. overseas bases simultaneously." (*U. S. News & World Report*, Jan. 31, 1958)

The Gaither Report is more comprehensive and more incisive. It said that the United States is today highly vulnerable to Russian attacks. It described the rapid growth of the Soviet Union in military capabilities, especially in ballistic missiles. It concluded that the United States is falling dangerously behind in the missile race. Even in economic strength, the Report added, the Soviet Union is growing at a faster rate than the United States. (*U.S. News & World Report*, Jan. 3, 1958.) In the economic part of the report, Dr. Gabriel Hauge, Eisenhower's economic adviser, gave a more specific conclusion: that since 1950 the Soviet economy has been growing at a rate roughly twice that of the United States. (*AP*, April 15, 1958.)

Here are comments of reliable reporters and columnists regarding the Gaither Report. Stewart Alsop, one of two Alsop brothers who write a syndicated column for the *N.Y. Herald-Tribune*, a winner, like his brother, of the National Press Association of the U.S. award for "most trustworthy reporting," said: "The United States has received the grimmest warning in history. According to the Gaither Report submitted to the President on November 7, 1957, the Soviets are so far ahead of this country [U.S.] in the missile race that it will not be possible fully to overtake them before 1960-61 at the earliest." (*Bulletin*, Nov. 28, 1957.) A week later Alsop wrote that the crisis which faces the United States today is "not a temporary one, to be rather quickly resolved like the Suez crisis of last year. It is an underlying crisis caused by the unbalance in the world power balance of which the Sputniks have served as a symbol." According to the Gaither Report, he said, "the balance can not be restored and the crisis abated until 1960 at the earliest." (*Bulletin*, Dec. 5, 1957.) Alsop followed this up with a longer article in the *Saturday Evening Post* (Dec. 14, 1957) entitled "How can we catch up?", stressing the same military unbalance.

Walter Lippmann, the top American foreign affairs commentator, speaks of a "crisis of confidence." The United States and her allies, according to him, suddenly came to a "cold realization about the situation we are in." The balance has been lost by the United States and "it can not be restored, if it can be restored, for many long years to come. As our military technology has fallen behind, our diplomacy has become frozen and sterile and without a vision and a purpose of better things to come," (*Bulletin*, Dec. 5, 1957.)

The London *New Statesman*, was quite direct. It said about the Gaither Report: "The report described the Soviet lead over the United States as 'absolute' " and until 1961 "the United States would depend for its national survival on *Russian benevolence* rather than on its own capacity to defend itself." (London *New Statesman*, Jan. 4, 1958.)

David Laurence, who generally represents the thinking of the most conservative elements in the United States, including its power elite, said: "When our big cities and our principal air and missile bases were simultaneously destroyed by the 'first blow', there couldn't be much of anything left with which to retaliate. Americans have been slow to realize the peril that may confront them." (*U. S. News & World Report*, Jan. 10, 1958.)

To complete the national survival picture in the United States, I will only have to add that, according to American estimates, casualties in case of a nuclear war would reach seventy-two million American killed, and twenty-five million injured in the first few hours of the nuclear war, with somewhat less casualties on the Soviet side because of bigger territory and more scattered population and industrial areas.

The picture of our own physical survival -- It is most appalling

With this as background, let us look at our own national survival picture in case of war. First, let us be realistic and honest enough to admit that in case of a war such as has been portended by experts the efforts that our people could make in aiding our allies or fighting the enemy, would be insignificant. Our "allies" know this, the United States in particular, and in their unguarded moments have said so. This is nothing to be ashamed of. It is simply that militarily we are next to nothing in relation to the military strength of the two giant powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. In order not to become or not to continue to be the laughing stock of the world we should not believe and act as if our allies really depended upon and needed our strength, however little we can offer, in case of a military showdown. We should guard against being inveigled or pushed into adopting a defiant or challenging attitude against other nations because we can never be sure if we can count on our allies when they feel they no longer need us or are unable to protect us.

But it has been urged in some quarters that although we are militarily weak, we can gain strength by permitting the United States to maintain missile bases within our territory. The fallacy of this thinking is what I intend to show today. It is the central theme of my discussion.

American bases in time of peace

Let us begin by inquiring into the real purposes of establishing bases in the Philippines. In time of peace, foreign bases serve as protection for foreign investments within the country where the bases are established. In my discussion on bases nineteen months ago, I explained this point at some length. Senator Confesor, the famous guerrilla, staunchest defender of the American flag in the Philippines in the last war and whose love for America is therefore beyond question, said in 1947 during the discussions of the parity rights which the Nacionalistas then opposed, that the American bases were primarily intended to protect American investments in our country. This is a lesson which the peoples of the colonized areas of the world have learned the hard way and which we can ignore only at a very high price: the welfare of our people.

Sacrificial victims for the American people to survive

In time of war, these bases take on their real military character, and there is where the problem of our physical national survival enters. Assuming that the United States could protect its "allies" ---- a dubious assumption since 1954 as I shall later show ---- American commentators candidly admit that the purpose of these bases is not our protection against, but our invitation to enemy attack in order to protect the people in the United States at the cost of the lives of our own people. I realize that this is a rather strong statement to make, and that a responsible representative of the people should not indulge in any speculation no matter how well-grounded. But I became convinced that it was no longer speculation when the military commentator of the *New York Times*, Hanson Baldwin, trusted man in U.S. military circles, who has been writing in the *N.Y. Times* on military subjects for over twenty years, said in February 1957 (*N. Y. Times Weekly Review*, Feb. 17, 1957), that the role of the U.S. overseas bases in the world, ---- bases in the Philippines are among them ---- is to "act as magnets for enemy attacks, thus dispersing and weakening his threat to our [United States] cities and fixed installations." This he reiterated in a later article. (*N.Y. Times Weekly Review*, Aug. 18, 1957.)

I am the first to admit that it is understandable that political and military leaders of the United Stated should devise ways and means of protecting the lives of their own people. If in a nuclear war they stand to lose 100 million in the first few hours of a concentrated enemy attack, it would be natural for them to try to minimize their casualties by diverting the attack. Overseas bases, like those in the Philippines, are precisely the diversionary objectives for such enemy attack on the United States.

That is the reason why I did not harbor any hatred, ill will or resentment when I learned that the role assigned to U.S. overseas bases was to act as *magnets for enemy attacks* in order to disperse the attack on the American population.

What I deplore and condemn is the way we passively accept the role of magnets or decoys to draw enemy attacks away from the United States and, like fools, believe in what the Jusmag Chief, General Nutter, said in his first press conference that "strategic missile bases in the Philippines are for the defense of freedom in this part of the world." Ignorance of the true purpose of overseas bases of the United States is unpardonable now that American columnists and commentators and even military men have frankly admitted that the role assigned to these bases is to serve as magnets or decoys for enemy attacks. It would therefore take a very irresponsible if not a traitorous mind not to give the most serious consideration to the idea of permitting the establishment of missile bases in our country.

Without these missile bases there is a chance that we might be spared and we should cling to that, no matter how slim. With missile bases installed here we are doomed: a few hydrogen megaton bombs dropped in, say, five or six separate areas, in five minutes from the time of their launching, would wipe out our whole population. President Garcia foresaw this when in his statement favoring the establishment of missile sites here made this significant remark: "The wrath of the Communists is to be expected." In other words, the President knows perfectly well what is coming to us if we accept these missile sites. But, unfortunately, our people do not know.

Lippmann says America can no longer protect us

We have been made to believe that American bases were established here for our protection against enemy aggression. That may have been true before the missiles age, but since 1954, even before the Sputnik age, it has become a myth. Walter Lippmann, columnist of the *New York Herald-Tribune*, who recently won a special Pulitzer Award for "the wisdom, perception and high sense of responsibility with which he has commented for many years on national and international affairs," (*AP*, May 6, 1958), wrote an article for the February 9, 1954 issue of *Look* (magazine) in which he said, after analyzing the power relations at that time, that the United States was no longer in a position to defend or protect its allies. Since then, America's relative position has not improved, instead it has deteriorated, and a few months after the launching of the first Sputnik, the problem of their own national survival is admitted by their leaders to have become their highest national concern.

A brief review of the history of this painful process, painful to those of us who have pinned our sincere hopes on America's world leadership, is profitable. As early as July 1952, the highest British leaders of the army, the navy, and the air force, went to the United States and brought to the attention of the American authorities their unanimous opinion favoring concentration on air power. This impressed the American leaders so much that President Truman ordered a study of the Soviet air power by the top scientists of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M.I.T.). This study was called *Project Lincoln*. The Report, which reached Truman before the elections of November 1952, was appalling. It said that within twenty-four months the Soviet Union would have developed an air power that could devastate the United States, making it clear that in using the word "devastate" they intended its dictionary meaning: to destroy to the point of compelling one to sue for peace. The *Project Lincoln* Report was discussed by Alsop in a series of syndicated articles which appeared in a local morning daily in March 1953. It was undoubtedly this Report which formed the starting point leading to Walter Lippmann's conclusion in February 1954 that the United States was no longer in a position to protect its allies.

In the middle of 1954, Thomas K. Finletter, Air Force Secretary under Truman, wrote his book: *Power and Policy*. In the very first chapter entitled, "The Intolerable Atomic Absolute," he predicted that by 1956 the Soviet Union would reach their absolute air-atomic power. What happened in the Egyptian crisis in November 1956 served to confirm the prediction. The Gaither and the ORO Reports I have mentioned obviously arrived at similar conclusions. To add the obvious, in terms of nations, one who is concerned about his own survival can not be expected to risk it for the sake of another. In Hanson Baldwin's words, the annihilation of others, even those on your own side, might be needed to insure your own survival. Washington had said in his "Farewell Address" to his fellow Americans: "We shall choose war or peace as our own self-interest will counsel." Now, if the strong and powerful is already thinking of his problem of survival, it would be criminal negligence for the weak not to think of his own.

Unfortunately, our thinking, the thinking of our national leaders, has not kept pace with fast changing events. We still think of depending on protection by other nations long after alien protection has become a myth. We speak of national secularity clinging tenaciously to our old notions when our problem is one of national survival. We are hypersensitive about our national dignity but we have allowed ourselves to be cajoled into accepting foreign dictation as our way of life.

In the event of war, with missile bases here we shall be annihilated within half an hour after it has started

In the event of another war, which doubtlessly would be nuclear, the probabilities are that Russia will strike the first blow. It is the prevailing opinion among the American military experts that Russia's grand strategy today, which came into her war plans since Khruschev took over in 1955, is based on the development of a nuclear striking power capable of so crippling the United States with a surprise attack that it would not be able to retaliate effectively. It was on this Soviet strategy that Secretary Dulles based his own of "massive retaliation." If there is war, it will be a global war, a war not only between the two giant powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, but between the Communist world and the Free world. And the first blow which the Communists will strike would not be limited to the territory of the United States, but would necessarily include the countries where the United States maintains missile bases. Communist China will most probably attack the American military installations in this part of the world, first of all the missile bases, in order to cripple America's ability to retaliate from this area with a nuclear counterattack. We need not worry about attacks on us with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) whose range is 5,000 miles or more. It is not likely that these would be used against us but against the United States. All that would be necessary to wipe us off the map are missiles of intermediate range (IRBMs) capable of negotiating a distance of 15,000 miles in five or seven minutes from the time of launching which allows only a maximum warning time of perhaps thirty seconds. Any military target in the Philippines is well within range of these intermediate range missiles launched from the nearest enemy coast. In other words, we would have received the full impact of the missile-nuclear attack even before the United States could have begun her "massive retaliation." That the United States has the capability of "massive retaliation" is a fact. We should feel happy about it. But what good is that to us? It will mean nothing for countries or people like ours which would have already been devastated and destroyed by the first blow. It is conceded that the United States will not strike the first blow, because defensive war has always been in her best tradition, but even if she did, the retaliation by the Communists, which we must suppose, will also be as massive, will mean the annihilation of the peoples in the countries where the missile bases are located. With missile sites in our territory, it is, therefore, irrelevant who strikes first. The result for us would be the same: total devastation and annihilation. The editorialist of a local evening paper (the *Daily Mirror*) wisely counseled:

> The Soviet and Red China threats should not be allowed to obscure the fact that a country with guided missiles bases in its territory runs a greater risk in war than a country with none. If for this reason alone, discussion of such bases should be premised on self-interest. The idea that offering one's territory as a missile base is an unselfish and noble act is extremely naive. It has no place in the reality of power politics.

That the United States should feel anxiety about establishing in Europe launching sites for its IRBMs in readiness for a massive retaliation against Soviet Russia, is not hard to understand. Targets in the Soviet Union can be brought within range of existing U.S. missiles from bases situated in any NATO territory. But here in our region no land bases for delivering these intermediate range missiles are necessary. They can be launched from carriers, from submarines, even from bombers, in the last case, from a distance of 500 miles with missiles of the "Polaris", "Thor", or "Jupiter" types, so that these bombers would not even have to fly over enemy territory. Or, if land bases for these missiles are all needed, they can be had in Formosa. The Generalissimo is eager to have them — he is anxious to reconquer the China mainland. Or why not in Okinawa, which is an American fortress? Why, of all places, the Philippines?

The willing sacrificial victim's last words

Gentlemen, we are faced with the problem of our people's survival. I said that it is the problem of problems. If we must all die in a nuclear war those whom we represent at least have a right to know why we have accepted such a sacrificial resolution. If after they have been properly informed of the appalling consequences of having stockpiles of ballistic missiles and launching bases in their midst, our people should still want to commit race suicide to help America survive, then be it so. I can picture the last agonizing Filipino under the flaming clouds of a devastating nuclear attack gasping out to Mother America the famous deprecation that St. Augustine, the greatest Doctor of the Church, addressed to God perhaps in one of those trances when reason capitulates to faith: *Lord, if we are deceived, it is by Thee.* — Mother America, if we are deceived it is by thee!

——oOo——

One of the secrets of the many-sided virtuosity of this man is his vast familiarity with literature, history, philosophy and the other general studies, and the notable facility of his versatile pen. Unconfined to a narrow groove of activity or specialization, his mind is universal in interest and curiosity. —Francisco Dalupan, *President of the University of the East.*

PICTORIAL . . . .

Biographical Data

Born February 8, 1890, in Tiaong, Tayabas (now Quezon).

Bachelor of Arts, Ateneo de Manila, 1909.

Master of Laws, University of Sto. Tomas, admitted to law practice, 1914.

Admitted to the Bar of the United States Supreme Court, 1924.

Doctor of Laws, *honoris causa*, University of Manila, 1936.

Doctor of Laws, *honoris causa*, Arellano University, 1949.

Member, House of Representatives, 1919-1928.

Minority Floor Leader, House of Representatives, 1919-1928.

Senator, Fifth Senatorial District, 1931-1935.

President Pro-Tempore and Majority Floor Leader, Philippine Senate, 1934.

President, Constitutional Convention, 1934-1935.

Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, 1935-1936.

Elected Senator with the highest number of votes, November 1941.

Honorary Member, Royal Academy of the Spanish Language, Spain, 1919.

Honorary Member, Royal Academy of Jurisprudence and Legislation, Spain, 1924.

Honorary Member, Royal Academy of Arts and Sciences, Spain, 1924.

Elected Senator, 1949.

Re-elected Senator, 1955.

Author of: *Bajo los Cocoteros* (poetry); *Solo entre las Sombras* (play); *Code of Civil Procedure Annotated; Monroísmo Asiático y otros ensayos; The Law of Belligerent Occupation; Three Years of Enemy Occupation; Validity of Payment During Enemy Occupation*, etc.

Claro M. Recto, then 44, President of the Constitutional Convention.

Recto, the poet, about 1913.

Ex-Representative and Mrs. Recto, nee Aurora Reyes, about 1929.

Recto shown with Senate President Quezon after the latter had congratulated him on the success of the Constitutional Convention.

Recto shown with Senate President Quezon after the latter had congratulated him on the success of the Constitutional Convention.

President Recto shaking hands with Manuel Roxas during a recess of the Convention. With them is Jose P. Laurel



President F. D. Roosevelt signing the Philippine Constitution. Recto is standing at the extreme right behind Quezon.

Recto presiding over the Constitutional Convention.

With the three happy Manuels (left to right): Roxas, Recto, Briones, and Quezon.

Justice Recto, third from left, honored by Supreme Court in 1936.

Barrister Recto arguing his case in court.

The Supreme Court in 1935. Recto, as freshman member, stands at the extreme right.

Recto, the consistent critic of President Ramon Magsaysay's policies, shakes hands with the President. Looking on is Senator Jose P. Laurel.

Recto delivering his Commencement Address "Asia for the Asians" at the MLQU Commencement Exercises, April 10, 1954.

Recto delivering a speech on the floor of the Senate on the Quemoy question.

President Sukarno presenting gifts to Recto when the latter visited Indonesia in November 1959.

To Mr. Claro Re
with my best wishe
for his personal w
and for the futur
the Philippin
Soekar

Delegates to the Constitutional Convention (1934-1935)

OFFICERS

President: CLARO M. RECTO

First Vice-President: RUPERTO MONTINOLA*

Second Vice-President: TEODORO SANDIKO*

Secretary: NARCISO PIMENTEL, SR.*

Sergeant-at-arms: NARCISO DIOKNO

DELEGATES

ABRA:
Julio Borbon*
Jesus Paredes

AGUSAN:
Apolonio D. Curato
Delfin Gumban

ALBAY:
Saturnino Benito
Jose Bonto
Ambrosio A. Calleja*
Jose D. Conejero
Braulio Leonardo
Francisco Muñoz
Toribio P. Perez
Jesus B. Surban

ANTIQUE:
Ramon Maza
Angel Salazar*

BAGUIO
Sixto A. Gaerlan*
Felipe E. Jose

BATAAN:
Roman A. Cruz
Miguel Cuaderno

BATANES:
Juan C. Castillejos*
Mariano A. Lizardo

BATANGAS:
Antonio Barrion*
Jose P. Laurel, Sr.*
Eusebio M. Lopez
Eusebio Orense*
Claro M. Recto
Conrado V. Sanchez

BOHOL:
Perfecto Balili
Teofilo B. Buslon
Jose M. Clarin*
Gaudencio Cloribel
Bernardino Inting*
Anastacio A. Mumar

BUKIDNON:
Pedro D. Melendez
Jose G. Sanvictores

BULACAN:
Nicolas Buendia*
Teodoro Sandiko*
Manuel L. Sevilla*
Antonio Villarama*

CAGAYAN:
Marcelo Adduru
Antonio Guzman
Miguel P. Pio

---

* Deceased

Vicente Nepomuceno*

CAMARINES NORTE:
Baldomero M. Lapak
Wenceslao Q. Vinzons*

CAMARINES SUR:
Manuel Abella
Severo Cea
Exequiel S. Grageda
Gabriel P. Prieto

CAPIZ:
Antonio A. Arcenas*
Jose Altavas*
Jose M. Hontiveros*
Manuel Roxas*
Teodulfo S. Suñer
Cornelio T. Villareal

CAVITE:
Demetrio B. Encarnacion
Vicente J. Francisco

CEBU:
Manuel C. Briones*
Casiano S. Carin*
Mariano Jesus Cuenco
Paulino Gullas*
Cesar Kintanar
Antonio Mansueto*
Juanito T. Maramara
Hilario C. Moncado*
Dionisio Niere
Nicolas Rafols
Felismeno V. Rivera*
Filemon Sotto
Vicente Sotto*
Antonio B. Ybanez

COTABATO:
Menandang Piang*
Blah Sinsuat

DAVAO:
Rafael S. Castillo
Pantaleon A. Pelayo

ILOCOS NORTE:
Maximino C. Bueno
Servando Castro*
Ireneo Ranjo*
Francisco Ventura

ILOCOS SUR:
Artemio Abaya*
Elpidio Quirino*
Vicente Singson Encarnacion

ILOILO:
Delfin Joven*
Jose M. Aldeguer
Fermin G. Caram
Tomas Confesor*
Tranquilino J. Divinagracia
Mariano Ezpeleta
Sofronio M. Flores
Jose C. Ganzon*
Tiburcio Lutero
Ruperto Montinola*
Matias P. Yusay*

ISABELA:
Miguel B. Binag
Elias Ocampo

LAGUNA:
Conrado Benitez
Jose M. Delgado
Domingo T. Zavalla
Pedro Guevara*

LANAO:
Tomas L. Cabili*
Alauya Alonto*

LA UNION:
Pio Ancheta*
Alejandro de Guzman*
Camilo Osias
Enrique S. Sobrepeña

LEYTE:
Quiremon Alkuino

Mateo Canonoy
Atilano R. Cinco
Ruperto Kapunan, Sr.*
Manuel Martinez*
Mamerto S. Ribo*
Rafael Martinez*
Norberto Romualdez*
Victorino N. Salazar
Francisco Zialcita

MANILA:
Salvador Araneta
Manuel Lim
Rafael Palma*
Gregorio Perfecto*

MARINDUQUE:
Ricardo Nepomuceno
Timoteo P. Ricohermoso

MASBATE:
Amancio Aguilar*
Jose Zurbito*

MINDORO:
Cipriano Liboro
Juan Navarro

MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL:
Jose Ozamis*
Paulino A. Conol

MISAMIS ORIENTAL:
Jose Artadi
Manuel C. Fernandez

MOUNTAIN PROVINCE:

APAYAO: Jose Fakangan*
Blas Villamor*

BENGUET: Jose M. Carino
Jose Velasco

BONTOC: Clement F. Irving*
Jose Lorenzana

IFUGAO: Alberto Crespillo
Miguel Gumangan

KALINGA: Max Duguiang
Saturnino Moldero

NEGROS OCCIDENTAL:
Pedro C. Hernaez
Juan L. Ledesma*
Simplicio Lizares
Jose C. Locsin
Enrique J. C. Montilla
Jesus Y. Perez

NEGROS ORIENTAL:
Sergio G. Jumawan*
Vicente Lopez
Jose E. Romero
Hermenegildo Villanueva

NUEVA ECIJA:
Eugenio Baltao
Florentino O. Chioco
Bonifacio Ysip
Exequiel M. Santos

NUEVA VIZCAYA:
Leon Cabarroguis
Demetrio Quirino

PALAWAN:
Gaudencio E. Abordo
Evaristo R. Sandoval

PAMPANGA:
Jose Alejandrino*
Felix B. Bautista*
Jose Gutierrez David
Juan D. Nepomuceno

PANGASINAN:
Jose M. Aruego
Pascual M. Beltran
Enrique Braganza
Leoncio R. Esliza*
Bernabe de Guzman*
Jose L. de Guzman

Anacleto D. Ramos*
Eusebio V. Sison*
Numeriano Tanopo
Juan Ventanilla

RIZAL:
Castor P. Cruz
Mariano Melendres
Domingo T. Dikit*
Juan Ortega*

ROMBLON:
Manuel T. Albero
Antonio J. Montesa

SAMAR:
Felipe Abrigo
Pedro R. Arteche*
Juan L. Bocar
Agripino P. Escareal
Serafin Marabut*
Luciano Ortiz*

SORSOGON:
Francisco Arellano
Adolfo Grafilo*
Mario Guariña*
Jose S. Reyes

SULU:
Jose Montaño*
Arolas Tulawi

SURIGAO:
Clementino V. Diez
Montano A. Ortiz

TARLAC:
Gregorio M. Banaga*
Alejandro A. Galang
Enrique Maglanoc
Luis Morales*

TAYABAS (now Quezon):
Romualdo Enriquez
Fabian R. Millar*
Godofredo Reyes*
Vicente Salumbides

ZAMBALES:
Alejo Labrador
Potenciano Lesaca*
Pablo Lorenzo

ZAMBOANGA:
Pablo Lorenzo
Florentino Saguin

# # #

BOOK REVIEW

By Maximo P. Fabella

A Day To Remember. By Eliseo Quirino. Manila: Benipayo Press, 1958. 302 pp.

How a community behaves under stress presents an exciting study. How did the Japanese conduct themselves during the Occupation? "How the people appeared and fared under these fearful and critical circumstances offers an interesting field of inquiry." (p. 6) These are but a few of the questions sought to be answered by *A Day To Remember*. The book has the advantage of perspective having been written after the events have settled down and could be fairly analyzed. The aim of the book in the author's own words is "to portray and interpret . . . Philippine's war-time story."

As a narrative of events, the author cannot help being critical of certain institutions, persons and classes. He does not mince words in criticizing the Commonwealth government, the "salaried" bureaucacy, the new "moneyed buy-and-sell" class. The author's critical analysis is by far the most vocal censure ever encountered in any book on the period. Here is a description of Manila's elite:

> . . . the nation's capital was politically dominated by the salaried class. The top crust of this class set the fashion, the ideals as well as the moral standard of the whole as well as the life of the city. The higher strata moved about not only as a symbol of class authority but as the very essence of the people's national life. Whoever desired to rise into prominence must have the approval of the elite. While merit had its value, it alone was not sufficient for the climb unless it was backed by the political protection of one at the

> top.... Money was one way of crashing the heights. In a society much given to luxury and vanity, one could show some glamour of wealth, who could live in a stately mansion and entertain, had the open sesame to the top. Political authority and wealth thus joined together to form an impregnable plutocracy to guide the life of the nation. (p. 49)

The writer condemns the new class that flourished as a result of "buy and sell' and the prevailing economic conditions of the time. In a rather strong language he said:

> ...there were personages and entities who themselves were directly or indirectly benefited. How come that in the midst of great want, suffering and starvation, these personages had amassed fortunes and properties and lived in luxury? How come that the traffickers of food and rice had easily enriched themselves despite the rules and laws against hoarding, while the people starved and became penniless? How come that government agents and the so-called economic police fattened while outwardly engaged in preventing illicit traffic, hoarding and speculation never stopped? How come that persons close to officials in high offices also prospered and did buy and sell business of their own?
>
> ... the Japanese could have obtained all the war materials needed ... but they could not have looted as systematically the industrial, commercial and agricultural equipment of the country as they did without the help of paid agents and official informers. More than three years of such life could not but leave an ugly scar upon the moral and spiritual life of the people. Deep deprivations had created deep hunger in their hearts. Their tragic losses had made them insensate to many of the finer ways of life. (pp. 145-7)

The Japanese control over the country was complete and all-embracing. At the outset they imposed economic restrictions with the end in view of serving their war efforts. Banks were curtailed. Paper currency flooded the country resulting in inflation. Pre-war Japanese commercial houses were revived to exploit the natural resources. Cooperatives were organized to control production.

Political regimentation was as tight as the economic stranglehold. The press was under rigid censorship. Education was controlled. Civilian movements were curtailed by a system of passes and *zonas*.[1] The *kempeitai* was a by-word of terror in every home. This was the Filipino's first taste of a "policc state."

The chapters "Doom of the City" and "City of the Dead" is so vivid that the reader sees the events as if it were before his eyes. Here is a paragraph:

> More than a battlefield, Manila was a charnel house. Yet, as a battlefield neither was it a spot where valiant men fought and staged a heroic and ennobling fight. Rather it was a charnel house where men were murdered in cold blood and women raped and helpless children and the aged shared the same despicable death alike. The Japanese vowed there could be no Filipino alive to see the return of the Americans. The wholesome massacre of the people and the burning of the city to the ground all too eloquently demonstrated how accurst was their deed. The city was an appalling sight. Accounted dead were no less than sixty thousand persons, while all the city's vital section, including its priceless historic relics and buildings, were a total wreck. The dead littered all the streets, also the yards and the sanctuaries where their butchers had left them. Ghastly and haggard, the few survivors crept out of the still smoking debris. (p. 253)

The author uses the topical arrangement. As used in the book, the main objection is that the author in the discussion of events leans too far backwards. Let us take the chapter "Manila — Old and New". Here the origin of the city is traced to the time the cross was planted. Since the book is about the Japanese occupation, a background of a few decades rather than centuries would have sufficed.

An error which the reviewer noticed is the statement that "before the invasion nothing was more remote in the minds of the Filipino people than the thought of fighting Japan." (p. 11) This reviewer could not agree because of the passage of the National Defense Act in 1935. The law was passed obviously to build an army to defend the Philippines. But against whom? Among her neighbors, China was too busy with her internal

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(1) Reconcentration areas.

Ambeth Ocampo

problems; only Japan displayed aggressive tendencies. Her conquest of Korea, Formosa and Manchuria was a warning to the Philippines. Japan's action in the battle of Manila Bay, the presence of Japanese warships, showed her hand.

By and large the book is a successful portrayal and interpretation. The work is also a sourcebook on the origins of some of our present social-economic problems like black-market, hoarding, etc. Mr. Quirino's book is a contribution not only to history but to literature as well.

# # #

AMBETH R. OCAMPO

KAPISANANG PANGKASAYSAYAN NG PILIPINAS
Maynila, Pilipinas

PAGPAPARANGAL

Kay
CLARO M. RECTO

Senador ng Pilipinas, magiting na tagapagtanggol ng kapakanang Pilipino, pangunahing makabansa, matapat na taliba ng mga karapatang-bayan, pantas na mambabatas, dalubhasang mahistrado, dakilang makata, at Pangulo ng Kapulungang Pangsaligang-Batas;

Dahil sa kanyang pagpukaw sa diwang makabayan na ngayo'y naglalagablab sa dibdib ng bayan;

Dahil sa kanyang marubdob na pagtataguyod sa dangal ng sambayanang Pilipino;

Dahil sa kanyang paham at masusing pagsusuri sa mga suliranin ng bansa;

Dahil sa kanyang pagtataguyod ng makabansang patakaran at pamalakad sa pakikitungong panglabas ng Pilipinas;

Dahil sa tining ng kanyang loob at sa talas ng kanyang diwang bukal ng malilinaw na kaisipan;

Dahil sa kanyang pagpupunyaging maging karapat-dapat ang bansa sa paggalang ng mga kapwa bansa;

Ang KAPISANANG PANGKASAYSAYAN NG PILIPINAS ay marangal na nagkakaloob ng plakang ito kay Senador CLARO M. RECTO bilang tanda ng paggalang at paghanga sa kanyang kadakilaan.

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